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Abstract
In this dissertation, we study whether individuals with differing interests are
able to achieve a socially efficient outcome in the presence of incomplete in-
formation about the others. Unlike the case of complete information, an indi-
vidual’s decision may reveal his private information, thereby impinging on the
others’ decisions. This signaling aspect of one’s decision would force a decision
maker to take account of what others would come to know about his private
information. Studying this feature leads us to a rigorous examination, first of
all, of how the notion of information ought to be understood and thus to be
mathematically formulated; and secondly, of how this signaling aspect reduces
the range of achievable efficient decision rules relative to the case of complete
information.
In the first chapter titled “Formalization of Information: Knowledge and
Belief”, we engage in the first task by studying the issue Billingsley (1995)
and Dubra and Echenique (2004) raise about the use of σ-algebra to model
information. They provide an example to show that the formalization of in-
formation by σ-algebras and by partitions need not be equivalent. Although
Hervés-Beloso and Monteiro (2013) provide a method to generate a σ-algebra
from a partition and another method for going in the opposite direction, we
show that their two methods are in fact based on two different notions of infor-
mation: (i) information as belief, (ii) information as knowledge. If information
is conceived to allow for falsehood, case (i) above, the equivalence between σ-
algebras and partitions holds after applying the notion of posterior-completion
suggested by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987). If information is conceived not
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to allow for falsehood, case (ii) above, the equivalence holds only for measurable
partitions and countably-generated σ-algebras.
In the second chapter titled “Common Knowledge and Efficiency with In-
complete Information”, we engage in the second task. Holmström and Myerson
(1983) show that we need only check for efficiency on common knowledge events
to determine that an incentive compatible decision rule is efficient. By a sharper
notion of common knowledge, based on the notion of posterior-completion de-
scribed in the first chapter, we show that we need only check for efficiency in
a strict subset of common knowledge events known as self-evident events and
furthermore, that this is the minimal class of events that one needs to check.
In the third chapter titled “Mediator Selection in International Conflict:
Bias, Effectiveness, and Incidence”, we adapt the question of achieving effi-
ciency to the context of international conflicts and mediation. As war incurs a
cost, an efficient outcome is thus a peaceful one in this context. We allow for
disputants to make a joint decision whether to accept a potentially biased me-
diator who would communicate with them and propose a decision rule on their
behalf. This extends the mechanism design problem of Hörner et al. (2015) to
allow for mediator bias and its endogenous determination. Our main finding is
that both disputants would accept a biased mediator if war is highly likely to
occur in a conflict and the mediator’s bias is moderate. More importantly, once
a mediator has been accepted, the probability of attaining peace is independent
of the intensity of her bias: because war is inefficient, the interest of the medi-
ator’s favored disputant is best served by promoting peace.
Advisors: Ying Chen, M. Ali Khan
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In any model that deals with a decision maker (henceforth DM) facing uncer-
tainty, the DM’s information is often described by either a signal (equivalently,
a random variable), a partition or a σ-algebra. Specifically, one signal is more
informative than another if it is sufficient in Blackwell’s sense for another; one
partition is more informative than another if it is finer; a σ-algebra is more infor-
mative than another if it is larger.1 A natural question is whether all these three
orderings can be equivalently used to represent information. In other words, it
is to ask whether there is a mapping from one category of representation to
another while preserving the ordering in the two categories that are being used.
The answer to this question had been understood to be positive. Nevertheless,
as we shall see below, the understanding is far from complete.
1For a pair of partitions, the strictly finer partition distinguishes more elements, implying
that a DM can say more accurately about the true state (the state in which she lies). For a
pair of σ-algebras, the larger one contains more sets. For larger number of sets, a DM is able
to say whether it contains the true state or not, thus having more information.
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Billingsley (1995) raises concerns that partitions and σ-algebras may not
always be equivalently used by presenting a simple but powerful example: a
unit interval is given as the state space equipped with the Lebesgue measure.
A partition that consists of every singleton indicates that the DM knows ex-
actly in which state she lies. On the contrary, the smallest σ-algebra generated
by the partition implies that the DM is totally ignorant, for it contains count-
able or co-countable sets that are of Lebesgue measure zero.2 In addition,
Dubra and Echenique (2004) highlight Billingsley’s concern by embedding his
example in the context of a decision problem. They consider another partition
that contains only two cells. This partition is obviously less informative than
the partition in Billingsley’s example. However, if one compares the expected
utility values conditional on the smallest σ-algebras generated by those parti-
tions, the value based on the two-cell partition is larger. That is, the σ-algebra
generated by the two-cell partition is more informative.
In response to these cautionary warnings, Hervés-Beloso and Monteiro (2013)
(henceforth HM) argue that one may disregard them. By taking a partition as a
primitive representation of information, they introduce a notion of an informed
set which corresponds to a (possibly uncountable) union of partition cells. The
collection of all informed sets is indeed a σ-algebra. If one generates σ-algebras
in this way, a strictly finer partition always yields a larger σ-algebra. Arguably,
the collection of informed sets represents the informational content of a given
partition. To establish the equivalence between partitions and σ-algebras, they
also suggest another method of deriving a partition from a given σ-algebra.
2By the smallest σ-algebra generated by the partition, we mean that the σ-algebra contains
all the complements and the countable unions of partition cells.
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Given a measure space equipped with a strongly-Blackwell σ-algebra, HM sug-
gest to form a partition by collecting atoms of a σ-algebra if it is countably-
generated.3 If not, they suggest to consider a countably-generated σ-algebra
that differs from the given σ-algebra by null sets.4 This implies, although HM
do not so explicitly argue, that the informational content of a σ-algebra is cap-
tured by the corresponding countably-generated σ-algebra.
In this paper, our primary goal is to show that HM leave unsettled the follow-
ing question, “What is the information (equivalently, the informational content)
preserved when one generates a σ-algebra from a partition or when one goes in
the opposite direction?” HM claim that it is the collection of informed sets, and
they interpret the notion of an informed set to denote the set of which occurrence
(or non-occurrence) a DM knows. This naturally leads one to ask a question
about the difference between what one merely knows and what one is informed
of. Unfortunately, however, HM are silent on this question. In addition, the in-
formational content, as HM claim, is also captured by the countably-generated
σ-algebra that differs from a σ-algebra by null sets. This implies that if both a
partition and a σ-algebra contain the same informational content, the collection
of informed sets of the partition must be countably-generated. We present a
counterexample in which this is not the case (Example 5). Furthermore, the col-
lection of informed sets of a partition may contain non-measurable sets, because
the informed sets do not depend on a given measurable space. We show that
3A countably generated σ-algebra is the smallest σ-algebra generated by a collection of
countably many subsets of the state space.
4A null set is a set to which a DM ascribes zero probability. HM refers to it as a negligible
set of states.
3
this indeed happens in Billingsley’s example (Example 4). This poses a tech-
nical impossibility of defining a probability measure on the non-measurable set
when computing the expected utility value as in Dubra and Echenique (2004),
not to mention a conceptual difficulty of how to understand that a DM is in-
formed about a set lying outside the event space.5 More importantly, HM’s
treatment provides a contradictory answer about whether a probability mea-
sure conveys any informational content or not. As noted, informed sets of a
partition is invariant to any choice of a measure space and a measure defined on
it. This suggests that a probability measure does not convey any information.
Contradictorily, a probability measure conveys information if one considers the
informational content embodied in a σ-algebra, as it is unique up to null sets.
The secondary goal of this paper is to tackle these issues and to establish
an equivalence relationship between a partition and a σ-algebra in representing
information. Our innovation is to bring out with especial salience the two
distinct notions of information, knowledge and belief, that are well-recognized
among researchers working in epistemic logic and game theory.6 The distinction
lies in whether information is conceived to be factual or not. To elaborate, if one
insists that information cannot be false in order to distinguish it from a rumor,
then he conceives information to arise from knowledge. On the contrary, if one
allows for the possibility that information may turn out to be false, then he
conceives information to arise from belief.
5The existence of non-measurable sets can be addressed by Theorem 4 and the following
Remark 3 in HM. However, the notion of an informed set, as it is defined in HM, fails to
accommodate this: the collection of informed sets in Billingsley’s example, according to HM,
is the power set even when the underlying σ-algebra is strongly Blackwell (See Example 4 in
HM). In fact, we propose the notion of an informed event to accommodate Theorem 4 and
Remark 3 in HM.
6See, for example, Aumann (1999a,b), Maschler et al. (2013), and Meyer (2003).
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The advantage of bringing out these two notions of information is that each
notion, either knowledge or belief, is formally defined as an operator from a mea-
surable space (or, equivalently, an event space) to itself that satisfies a certain
set of axioms (Definition 4, 5). One can thus see easily whether a mathematical
object such as a partition and a σ-algebra qualifies for being a formalization
of information (as knowledge/belief), by inspecting the relationship between
a knowledge/belief operator to the mathematical object of one’s interest. By
taking advantage of the two notions, we resolve the issues that HM leave open.
Firstly, we show that the notion of an informed event imposes a counterfactual
restriction on that of knowledge/belief. To be specific, we define a K-informed
event for information as knowledge, and a B-informed event for information as
belief. An informed event requires that if one knows/believes whether an event
occurs or not at one state, then he must know/believe it even in a hypothetical
situation that he lies at other states (Example 3). Secondly, we show that the
collection of K-informed events is the restriction of the collection of informed
sets (defined by HM) to a measurable space, thereby resolving the issue regard-
ing the presence of non-measurable set (Lemma 3). This is immediate from the
definition of knowledge/belief being an operator from a measurable space to
itself.
Turning to the remaining issues, we show that if one conceives information
as knowledge, measurable partitions and countably-generated σ-algebras can be
used interchangeably to formalize information (Theorem 4). This implies that
the preserved informational contents are the K-informed events of measurable
partitions. Moreover, it also reveals that probability does not convey any infor-
mation, for the K-informed event is invariant to a specific choice of a probability
5
measure.
A further question is whether we need restrict the use of partitions or σ-
algebras only to the case where partitions are measurable or σ-algebras are
countably-generated. We argue that if one conceives information as belief, we do
not need such a restriction. By adopting the technique of posterior-completion7
proposed by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), we show that if the posterior-
completion of a σ-algebra is larger then the posterior-completion of a partition
is strictly finer, and vice versa. Then, what is the informational content in this
case? We argue that the informational content is indeed the collection of B-
informed events, and it depends on a specific choice of a probability measure.
Specifically, a proper regular conditional probability (either directly from a σ-
algebra or from the smallest σ-algebra generated by a partition) captures the
notion of belief. More importantly, the collection of B-informed events is the
posterior-completion of a given σ-algebra. Since B-informed events are defined
in relation to a given probability measure, probability conveys information.
The paper is structured as follows: we present preliminary definitions in-
cluding the notions of knowledge and belief in Section 2. In Section 3, under
the conception of information as knowledge, we establish an equivalence be-
tween measurable partitions and countably-generated σ-algebras in formalizing
information. Moreover, we discuss the issues regarding the notion of informed
sets as formalized by HM. Section 4 consists of an equivalence result under the
conception of information as belief. Then, we conclude in Section 5.
7The posterior-completion of a σ-algebra is to create the smallest σ-algebra by adding
events that are either measure zero or one with a proper regular conditional probability
measure, into a given σ-algebra. The posterior-completion of a partition is to add in those
events to the partition.
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1.2 Preliminaries
Partitions and σ-algebras Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space, where Ω is a
nonempty set of states endowed with a σ-algebra F , so-called the event space.
Measurable sets of the σ-algebra F are called events. We assume that Ω is a
complete separable metric space, and the event space F is a strongly Blackwell
σ-algebra.8 The complement of an event E is denoted by ¬E.
Definition 1. Let X and Y be partially ordered sets (posets) with the partial
orderings X and Y . A mapping Φ : X → Y is an order isomorphism if Φ
is bijective and preserves order in the following sense: x X x′ ⇐⇒ Φ(x) Y
Φ(x′). If such an order-isomorphism exists, X and Y are said to be order-
isomorphic.
Definition 2 (Partition). Let (Ω,F) be given. A collection of nonempty events
is called a partition and denoted by Π if it satisfies the following:
(1) ∪{E|E ∈ Π} = Ω;
(2) If E,F ∈ Π and E 6= F , then E ∩ F = ∅.
Note that we define a partition to be a collection of events (or, equivalently,
measurable sets). Let Πω denote an element of Π containing a state ω, and it
is unique. For two partitions Π and Π′, we say that Π is finer than Π′, denoted
by Π P Π′, if for each ω ∈ Ω, Πω ⊆ Π′ω. Let P be a collection of all partitions
of Ω. Then, P is a partial ordering on P and (P,P ) is a partially ordered set
(poset).
8A σ-algebra is a strongly Blackwell σ-algebra if it is separable and every two countably
generated sub-σ-algebras with the same atom coincide.
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Definition 3 (Sub-σ-algebra). Let (Ω,F) be given. A sub-σ-algebra G is a
sub-collection of events satisfying the following two properties:
(1) Closed under complements: for any E ∈ G, ¬E ∈ G.
(2) Closed under countable unions: for any countable number of events {Ei}i∈I
with Ei ∈ G, ∪i∈IEi ∈ G.
For a σ-algebra G and a state ω ∈ Ω, an atom A(ω,G) = ∩{G ∈ G|ω ∈ G}
is the smallest set containing ω in a σ-algebra G. Whenever G is obvious, we
simply denote it by Aω.
Let Σ be a collection of all sub-σ-algebras of Ω. A sub-σ-algebra G is larger
than H if for every E ∈ H, E ∈ G. This naturally defines a partial ordering σ
on Σ such that for two sub-σ-algebras G and H, G σ H if G is larger than H.
Then, (Σ,σ) is a poset.
For the two posets (P,P ) and (Σ,σ), define a mapping F : (P,P ) →
(Σ,σ) such that for Π ∈ P , F (Π) is the smallest σ-algebra generated by the
partition cells of Π. Then, as the following example from Billingsley (1995)
shows, F is not an (order) isomorphism.
Example 1 (Billingsley). Let Ω = [0, 1] ⊂ R endowed with a Borel σ-algebra











}. Then, F (Π) = {E ∈












is finer than Π′ (Π P Π′). However, neither σ-algebra is larger than the other:
neither F (Π) σ F (Π′) nor F (Π′) σ F (Π).
Belief and Knowledge The following definitions are standard in the litera-
ture on epistemic logic and game theory. For example, see Aumann (1999a,b),
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Maschler et al. (2013), and Meyer (2003).
Definition 4 (Belief). Let (Ω,F) be given. An operator B : F −→ F is said
to be a belief if B satisfies the following axioms:
A1 Conjunction: For any countable index set I and events {Ei}i∈I with
∩i∈IEi ∈ F , ∩i∈IB(Ei) = B(∩i∈IEi).
A2 Consistency: B(E) ∩B(¬E) = ∅.
A3 Positive introspection: B(E) ⊆ B(B(E)) for E ∈ F .
A4 Negative introspection: ¬B(E) ⊆ B(¬B(E)) for E ∈ F .
For ω ∈ Ω and E ∈ F , ω ∈ B(E) is read as “A DM believes an event E at a
state ω.” Therefore, for an event E, B(E) is an event that whenever it occurs,
the DM believes that the event E occurs. In this sense, B(E) is the event that
is an evidence based on which the DM believes E.
Definition 5 (Knowledge). Let (Ω,F) be given. An operator K : F −→ F
is said to be knowledge if it satisfies the axioms of a belief operator and the
following additional axiom:
A5 Non-delusion: K(E) ⊆ E for E ∈ F .
Note that a knowledge operator K is also a belief operator, but the converse
does not hold in general. In what follows, we shall use B to denote a belief
operator and K a knowledge operator. Similarly to the case of belief, we say
that the DM knows at ω that the event E occurs, or simply that the DM knows
E at ω if ω ∈ K(E).
Any belief operator B satisfies the following properties:
9
A6 Necessitation: B(∅) = ∅.
A7 Monotonicity: E ⊆ F implies B(E) ⊆ B(F ).
The proof is easy, so we omit it.9 Given a belief operator, one can completely
describe what the DM believes at each state, or his doxastic status. Similarly, a
knowledge operator specifies what the DM knows at each state, or his epistemic
status. If one chooses a different belief (or knowledge) operator, it indicates
a different doxastic (or epistemic) status as it is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 2. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2} and F = 2Ω. Consider two knowledge operators,
K and K ′ such that K({ω}) = {ω} for ω ∈ Ω, and K ′({ω}) = ∅. Let ω be
the true state. For any event E with ω ∈ E, ω ∈ K(E) but ω 6∈ K ′(E) unless
E = Ω. The knowledge operator K thus implies that a DM knows all the events
that actually occur at the true state. On the contrary, K ′ indicates that the
DM does not know any event that occurs, except for that the state space Ω
itself occurs.
Note that the notion of belief and thus of knowledge rely on the event space
F . Although the definitions given in this paper are standard in the literature
on epistemic logic and game theory, this reliance may raise an issue about why
some sets of states, if they lie outside the event space, are precluded from being
the subjects of belief and knowledge. This issue becomes trivial if the event
space is given as the powerset. Hence, we shall focus on the case where the
event space is strictly smaller than the powerset. Then, a natural question
arises. What is the meaning of an event if it does not merely mean a set
9Interested readers may see, for example, Bacharach (1985).
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of states? Before answering this, one cannot understand why the set of states
being an event is essential in defining the notion of belief and thus of knowledge.
Unfortunately, however, there is no consensus about why some sets of states are
not events. Savage (1972) thus insists the event space to be the powerset, but for
a technical need to define a countably additive probability measure, the event
space is required to be smaller as in Arrow (1966). Shafer (1986) interprets this
restriction as complexity of describing states, thus of comparing acts. Villegas
(1964), implicit though, takes this point by taking events to be a primitive of
uncertainty. Taking Shafer’s point of view, we interpret the event space to be
the collection of sets of states which the DM is able to recognize.10 Accordingly,
sets of states lying outside the event space are not recognizable to the DM. As
the DM cannot believe/know those that he cannot recognize, we may preclude
those sets of states from being the subjects of belief and thus of knowledge.
Now, we define an informed event.
Definition 6 (Informed event). For a belief operator B : F −→ F , an event
E ∈ F is an B-informed event if B(E)∪B(¬E) = Ω. Similarly, for a knowledge
operator K, an event E ∈ F is said to be K-informed event. A DM is said to be
B-informed (K-informed, resp.) about an event E at ω if E is an B-informed
(K-informed, resp.) event and ω ∈ B(E) (ω ∈ K(E), resp.).
The above definition draws a distinction between what one knows/believes and
what one is informed about. Although he knows/believes the event, he may
not be informed about it. For him to be informed, he must know either the
10This interpretation is similar to the view in Heifetz et al. (2006). They consider events
to be “those that can be “known” or be the object of awareness.” For more discussion about
the conception of an event, see Al-Najjar (2009).
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event occurs or not at any state. This requires that the DM has counterfactual
knowledge/belief about the event. To illustrate this possibilities, consider a
variant of Example 2.3 in Halpern (1999).
Example 3. Bob is in a room with the light on. The door is painted either
red or blue, and he can tell which color. However, he might not have distin-
guished the colors, had the room been dark. Formally, there are four states,
{(red, off), (blue, off), (red, on), (blue, on)}, where (red, off) denotes a state
in which the door is red and the light is off, and the other states can be similarly
interpreted. Let RED, BLUE, ON, and OFF be the events that the door is red,
the door is blue, the light is on, and the light is off. Let K be the knowledge
operator describing Bob’s knowledge. Then, K(ON) = ON , K(OFF ) = OFF ,
K(RED) = {(red, on)}, and K(BLUE) = {(blue, on)}. Suppose that only the
event RED is of an agent’s interest, and the realized state is (red, on). As a
consequence, Bob knows that the event RED occurs. Were the realized state to
be (red, off), however, he would have not known that RED occurs, nor does
BLUE = ¬RED occur. For K(RED) ∪K(¬RED) = ON 6= Ω, RED is not
an informed event. Therefore, Bob is not informed of the event RED.
In this example, an event ON is a K-informed event. At the state (red, on), an
agent knows that the light is on. In addition, he would know whether the light
is on or off, even in his imagination that any other state might have occurred.
The following lemma shows that a K-informed event is sufficient for a DM
to know itself. In this sense, a K-informed event represents information.
Lemma 1. Let E be a K-informed event. Then, E is self-evident11: E = K(E).
11This term originates in Aumann (1999a). Whenever a self-evident event occurs, it informs
the DM of its occurrence. The self-evident event, therefore, is the knowledge about itself.
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Proof. Suppose that E is a K-informed event, i.e. K(E)∪K(¬E) = Ω. By A5,
K(E) ⊆ E, so it suffices to show that E ⊆ K(E). By A2, K(E) ∩K(¬E) = ∅
and thus ¬K(E) = K(¬E). Again by A5, ¬K(E) = K(¬E) ⊆ ¬E. Thus,
E ⊆ K(E).
By definition of knowledge and belief, it is easy to see that a K-informed event
is a B-informed event, but not every B-informed event is a K-informed event.
Moreover, a B-informed event is not necessarily self-evident.
1.3 Representation of Information as Knowl-
edge
We first present a well-known result on the relationship between a partition and
a knowledge operator.
Lemma 2. For a partition Π ∈ P , define KΠ(E) = {ω|Π(ω) ⊆ E} for each
E ∈ F . Then, KΠ satisfies A1-A5. For an operator K : F → F satisfying
A1-A5, define a partition ΠK = {ΠK(ω)|ω ∈ Ω}, where ΠK(ω) = ∩{E ∈
F|ω ∈ K(E)}. Then, Π = ΠKΠ.
For the proof, see Aumann (1999a). According to the above lemma, a K-
informed event can be defined with respect to a partition in the following way:
E is a K-informed event with respect to a partition Π if E = KΠ(E). By
adapting the notion of a K-informed event to a partition, we can compare our
notion of a K-informed event directly with HM’s notion of an informed set. For
comparison, we present HM’s notion of an informed set.
Definition 7 (Informed set in HM). A set E ⊆ Ω is an informed set defined
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by a partition Π if for every F ∈ Π, either F ⊆ E or F ⊆ ¬E. The collection
of informed sets of Π is denoted by IΠ.
The definition of an informed set by HM is related to ours by the following
lemma. Let FΠ denote the collection of K-informed events adapted to a parti-
tion Π.
Lemma 3. Let (Ω,F) be given. For a partition Π, let IΠ denote a collection
of its informed sets defined by HM, and let FΠ denote a collection of its K-
informed events. Then, FΠ = IΠ ∩ F . Moreover, FΠ is a sub-σ-algebra of
F .
The collection of informed sets by HM does not have to be a sub-σ-algebra.
That is, there may exist an informed set that is non-measurable.
Example 4. Let Ω = [0, 1] equipped with a Borel σ-algebra, and let µ be the
Borel measure defined on it. Let Π = {{ω}|ω ∈ Ω} be a partition that contains
all singletons. Then, the collection of its informed sets IΠ is the powerset.
Obviously, this is larger than the Borel σ-algebra, and contains a well-known
non-measurable set, so-called Vitali set. See Royden (1988) for its definition.
Now, we investigate the relationship between a knowledge operator and a σ-
algebra. From the discussion on partitions, one can easily see that a knowledge
operator defines a σ-algebra. What is not clear is whether a σ-algebra may
define a knowledge operator. For our purpose, we need the following definition.
Definition 8 (Countably generated σ-algebra). A sub-σ-algebra G is countably
generated if there is a collection of countably many events U = {Ei|i ∈ N} such
that G is the smallest σ-algebra containing U.
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We show that a countably-generated σ-algebra also represents information
as knowledge.
Lemma 4. Let G be a countably-generated sub-σ-algebra. Define for an event
E ∈ F ,
K(E) = ∪{G ∈ G|G ⊆ E}.
Then, K is indeed a knowledge operator. Moreover, every event in G is a K-
informed event, i.e. K(G) = G for every G ∈ G.
Proof. To show that K is a knowledge operator, it suffices to show A1,A4 and
A5, because they implies the rest (Bacharach, 1985). For A1, let (Ei)i∈I be
given for a countable index set I. Then, ∩i∈IK(Ei) = ∪{∩i∈IGi ∈ G|Gi ⊆
Ei,∀i ∈ I} = ∪{∩i∈IGi ∈ G| ∩i∈I Gi ⊆ ∩i∈IEi} = K(∩i∈IEi). For A4, since
a countably-generated σ-algebra G is a sub-σ-algebra of a strongly Blackwell
σ-algebra F , it is closed under complements and arbitrary unions, and thus
¬K(E) ∈ G holds. Then, K(¬K(E)) = ∪{G ∈ G|G ⊆ ¬K(E)} = ¬K(E).
Lastly, A5 and the last claim that K(G) = G for G ∈ G trivially follow from
the definition of K.
As both partitions and countably-generated σ-algebras represent information
as knowledge, one may wonder whether they can be always equivalently used.
Unfortunately, however, this is not true.
Example 5. Let Ω = [0, 1] endowed with a Borel σ-algebra F . Let µ be the
Borel measure. Define a mapping φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that for ω ∈ [0, 1],
φ(ω) = ω + α if ω + α ≤ 1 and φ(ω) = ω + α − 1 if ω + α > 1, where α is an
irrational number. Let ω ∼ ω′ be an equivalence relation on [0, 1] so that ω ∼ ω′
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if and only if φn(ω) = ω′ for some n ∈ N. Then, Π(ω) = {ω′|ω′ ∼ ω} is countable
and dense in [0, 1]. Moreover, the collection of these subsets Π = {Π(ω)|ω ∈
[0, 1]} is a partition of Ω. The informed events of this partition are well-known
to be φ-invariant measurable subsets of Ω and they have either measure 0 or
measure 1 (Cornfeld et al., 2012).12 Then, the collection of informed events FΠ
contains an atom of measure 1, which cannot be an element of Π, and thus it is
not countably-generated. Moreover, a partition Π′ generated by FΠ is not the
same as the partition Π.
The above example illustrates that if the collection of K-informed events from
a partition is not countably-generated, the partition generated by such a σ-
algebra does not preserve K-informed events when one goes from a σ-algebra to
a partition. Therefore, we restrict our attention to partitions whose collections
of K-informed events are countably-generated σ-algebras.
Definition 9. A partition Π is said to be measurable if FΠ is countably-
generated.
Let Σc be a sub-collection of Σ such that it contains all countably-generated
sub-σ-algebras. We naturally endow Σc with the partial ordering σ restricted
to Σc. With a slight abuse of notations, write it also as σ. Then, (Σc,σ) is
a poset. Let PM denote a collection of all measurable partitions of Ω, endowed
with a partial ordering P restricted to PM . Then, (PM ,P ) is a poset. Now,
we have our first main result as follows:
12The collection of informed sets suggested by HM consists of φ-invariant subsets of Ω. The
collection includes non-measurable subsets, and the collection of informed events excludes
those non-measurable subsets as it is obvious from Lemma 3.
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Theorem 1. The collection of measurable partitions (PM ,P ) and the collec-
tion of countably-generated sub-σ-algebras (Σc,σ) are order-isomorphic: De-
fine Φ : (PM ,P ) → (Σc,σ) such that for Π ∈ P , Φ(Π) = FΠ is a collection
of informed events. Define Ψ : (Σc,σ)→ (PM ,P ) such that for a countably-
generated sub-σ-algebra G ∈ Σc, Ψ(G) = {A(ω,G)|ω ∈ Ω} is a partition that
contains atoms of G. Then, the following properties hold.
(1) Φ is injective and order-preserving.
(2) Ψ is injective and order-preserving.
(3) Φ◦Ψ = IΣc and Ψ◦Φ = IPM , where IΣc and IPM are the identity functions
defined on Σc and PM , respectively.
Moreover, the informational content of a measurable partition Π or a countably-
generated sub-σ-algebra G is the collection of K-informed events, and a K-
informed set is defined by a knowledge operator K deriving from Π or G.
Remark 1. Note that an atom A(ω,G) of a countably-generated sub-σ-algebra
is an event (a measurable set) because a countably-generated sub-σ-algebra of a
strongly Blackwell σ-algebra F is closed under arbitrary unions as long as it is
measurable with respect to a larger σ-algebra. See Remark 3 of HM.
For comparison, we restate the result of HM in the following.
Lemma 5. Let (P,P ), (Σ,σ), and (Σc,σ) be given. Define Φ : (P,P
)→ (Σ,σ) such that for Π ∈ P , Φ(Π) = FΠ is a collection of informed events.
Define Ψ : (Σc,σ)→ (P,P ) such that for a countably-generated sub-σ-algebra
G, Ψ(G) = {A(ω,G)|ω ∈ Ω} is a partition that contains atoms of G. Then, the
following holds.
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(1) Φ is injective and order-preserving.
(2) Ψ is injective and order-preserving.
(3) For G ∈ Σc, (Φ ◦ Ψ)(G) = G, i.e. Φ ◦ Ψ = IΣc, where IΣc is the identity
function defined on Σc.
For proof of Theorem 4, see HM.
Remark 2. Note that the codomain of Φ is Σ, not Σc. Due to the existence
of non-measurable partition, as we show in Example 5, Ψ ◦ Φ = IP does not
hold. That is, Φ cannot have Ψ as its inverse, thus (P,P ) and (Σ,σ) are
not order-isomorphic. The proof of Theorem 4 follows naturally from the above
lemma and the definition of a measurable partition.
We are concluding this section by showing how our result addresses the
problem identified in Billingsley’s example.
Example 6. Recall that in Billingsley’s example, Ω = [0, 1] endowed with a
Borel σ-algebra F . Let Π be the partition that contains every singleton. Then,
the collection of K-informed events corresponding to Π consists of every event
in F . As the measurable space (Ω,F) is assumed to be a complete separable
metric space, F is countably-generated. Therefore, the partition Π′ generated
from F by collecting all of its atoms is indeed the same as Π.
1.4 Representation of Information as Belief
In this section, we fix (Ω,F , µ), and we additionally assume that F is a Borel
σ-algebra. We first argue that the generical equivalence of σ-algebras as it is
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defined in HM indeed represents information as belief, not as knowledge. For
this purpose, we present some definitions.
Definition 10 (Generical Equivalence of σ-algebra). Any two sub-σ-algebras
G and H are generically equivalent with respect to a probability measure µ if
(1) for every G ∈ G, there is H ∈ H such that µ(G4H) = 0, and
(2) for every H ∈ H, there is G ∈ G such that µ(G4H) = 0.
Definition 11 (Proper Regular Conditional Probability). Let (Ω,F , µ) and
let G be a sub-σ-algebra. Then, a regular conditional probability is a function
Q : F × Ω→ [0, 1] satisfying the following:
(1) for each ω ∈ Ω, Q(·, ω) is a probability measure on F .
(2) for each E ∈ F , Q(E, ·) is a version of p(E|G) such that p(E|G) is G-
measurable and integrable, and
∫
G
p(F |G)dµ = µ(F ∩G) for all G ∈ G.
Moreover, the regular conditional probability Q is said to be proper if Q(E,ω) =
1E(ω) for each E ∈ G, where 1E(ω) = 1 if ω ∈ E, and 0 otherwise.
By our assumption on the measurable space (Ω,F), a proper regular conditional
probability exists (Blackwell and Ryll-Nardzewski, 1963).13 Now, we show that
one can define a belief operator by a proper regular conditional probability.
Lemma 6. Let G be a sub-σ-algebra, and let Q(E,ω) be a proper regular condi-
tional probability derived from the probability space (Ω,F , µ) and G. Define an
13This reveals why we need to restrict F to be a Borel σ-algebra, instead of being a strongly
Blackwell σ-algebra in this subsection. If F is not a Borel σ-algebra, a proper regular condi-
tional probability may not exist. See Shortt (1984).
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operator B : F → F such that for each event E ∈ F ,
B(E) = {ω ∈ Ω|Qω(E) = 1}.
Then, B satisfies A1-A4. That is, B is a belief operator.
For the proof, see Brandenburger and Dekel (1987). In the above lemma, G can
be any σ-algebra which, for example, can be the smallest σ-algebra generated
by a partition. Therefore, one can always define a belief operator regardless of
whether one starts from a partition or from a σ-algebra. Similarly to the case
of knowledge, we consider a collection of all B-informed events and denote it by
FQ
In general, B does not satisfy A5, i.e. B(E) ⊆ E does not necessarily hold.
Therefore, B is not a knowledge operator. Moreover, note that for each ω ∈ Ω,
Qω is not a complete measure on G as the following example illustrates.
Example 7. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, F = 2Ω, and a sub-σ-algebra G = {∅, {ω1, ω2}, {ω3},Ω}.
The probability measure µ is given as µ({ω1}) = µ({ω3}) = 0.5. Let E = {ω2}
and F = {ω1, ω2}. The posterior beliefs for E and F at ω3 can be calculated
as Q(F, ω3) = Q(E,ω3) = 0. On the measurable space (Ω,G), Qω3 is not a
complete measure, for E 6∈ G.
Motivated by this observation, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) propose the
following:
Definition 12 (Posterior Completion). The posterior completion of a σ-algebra
G is the σ-algebra Ĝ generated by G and the class of sets {G ∈ G|Q(G,ω) =
0 for every ω ∈ Ω}. That is, Ĝ = {G ∈ G|Q(G,ω) = 0 or 1 for every ω ∈ Ω}
and it is said to be the posterior-completed σ-algebra.
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Although the definition takes a sub-σ-algebra as primitive, one can take a par-
tition as primitive as well by the following procedure: For a given partition Π,
generate the smallest σ-algebra containing the partition cells, say H, and then
apply the procedure described in the above definition to obtain the posterior-
completed σ-algebra Ĥ. Then, the posterior-completed partition Π̂ is the col-
lection of the atoms of Ĥ. As a matter of fact, the posterior completion of a
partition is to add in B-informed events. All these imply that the posterior-
completed σ-algebra is indeed a collection of all B-informed events. .
Lemma 7. Let G be a sub-σ-algebra, and let B be the resulting belief operator
(by Lemma 6). The posterior-completed σ-algebra of G is indeed a collection of
B-informed events:
Ĝ = {E ∈ F|B(E) ∪B(¬E) = Ω}.
By definition of the posterior-completed σ-algebra, the proof is obvious. In
Example 7, the posterior-completion leads to the powerset.
Define a binary relation ∼ such that for all two sub-σ-algebras G and H,
G ∼ H if Ĝ = Ĥ. It is not hard to see that this relation is an equivalence
relation. That is, the two sub-σ-algebras are considered to be equivalent if their
posterior-completed σ-algebras are identical. Now, we connect the notion of
generical equivalence to the notion of a posterior-completion.
Lemma 8. Any sub-σ-algebra is generically equivalent to its posterior-completion
with respect to the proper regular conditional probability measure Q.
Proof. Let G be a sub-σ-algebra, and let Ĝ be its posterior-completed σ-algebra
with respect to a proper regular conditional probability Q. Clearly, G ⊆ Ĝ. Take
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any event E ∈ Ĝ. If E ∈ G, it is trivial. Suppose that E 6∈ G. Then, for any
ω ∈ E, either Q(E,ω) = 0 or 1. If Q(E,ω) = 0, trivially there exists an empty
set in G satisfying Q(E4∅, ω) = 0. Otherwise if Q(E,ω) = 1, there exists an
event F ∈ G such that E ⊂ F and thus Q(F, ω) = 1. Hence, Q(E4F, ω) =
Q(F \ E,ω) = 0.
We are concluding this section by presenting our second main result that
establishes an equivalence between partitions and σ-algebras for representing
information as belief. Let P pc = P/∼ denote a collection of all posterior-
completion of partitions of Ω, endowed with a partial ordering P restricted to
P pc.14 Then, (P pc,P ) is a poset. Similarly, let Σpc = Σ/∼ denote a collection
of all posterior-completion of sub-σ-algebras, endowed with a partial ordering
σ restricted to Σpc. Then, (Σpc,σ) is a poset.
Theorem 2. The collection of all posterior-completed partitions (P pc,P ) and
the collection of all posterior-completed sub-σ-algebras (Σpc,σ) are order-isomorphic:
Define Φ : (P pc,P ) → (Σpc,σ) such that for Π ∈ P , Φ(Π) = FΠ is a col-
lection of B-informed events. Define Ψ : (Σpc,σ) → (P pc,P ) such that for
a posterior-completed sub-σ-algebra G ∈ Σpc, Ψ(G) = {A(ω,G)|ω ∈ Ω} is a
partition that contains atoms of G. Then, the following properties hold.
(1) Φ is injective and order-preserving.
(2) Ψ is injective and order-preserving.
(3) Φ ◦ Ψ = IΣpc and Ψ ◦ Φ = IP pc, where IΣpc and IP pc are the identity
14The equivalence relation ∼ between any two partitions Π and Π′ is defined so that the
smallest σ-algebras generated by these partitions, denoted by σ(Π) and σ(Π′), have the same
posterior-completed σ-algebra, i.e. σ(Π) ∼ σ(Π′).
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functions defined on Σpc and P pc, respectively.
Moreover, the informational content of a posterior-completed partition Π or a
posterior-completed sub-σ-algebra G is the collection of B-informed events, and
a B-informed set is defined by a belief operator B deriving from Π or G through
a proper regular conditional probability.
Proof. (1) is trivial, for the posterior-completed σ-algebra is the collection of all
B-informed events of the posterior-completed partition. For (2), suppose that G
and G ′ are two different posterior-completed σ-algebras such that G ⊆ G ′. The
corresponding partitions are Π = {A(ω,G)|ω ∈ Ω} and Π′ = {A(ω,G ′)|ω ∈ Ω}.
Take any ω ∈ Ω. Then, A(ω,G ′) = ∩{G ∈ G ′|ω ∈ G} = ∩{G ∈ G ∪ H|ω ∈
G} ⊆ ∩{G ∈ G|ω ∈ G} = A(ω,G). As to (3), it is easy to see that two different
posterior-completed partitions cannot yield the same σ-algebra. Therefore, it
suffices to show that two different posterior-completed σ-algebras generate two
different partitions. Suppose that G and G ′ are two different posterior-completed
σ-algebras. Assume without loss of generality that there exists an event E ∈ G
but E 6∈ G ′. Suppose to the contrary that the corresponding partitions are
the same, i.e. Π = {A(ω,G)|ω ∈ Ω} = {A(ω,G ′)|ω ∈ Ω}. Since Π is the
posterior-completed partition, there exists ω′ ∈ Ω and Π′(ω′) ⊆ E such that
Q′(Π′(ω′), ω′) = 1 whereQ′ is the proper regular conditional probability measure
defined by G ′ together with µ. Then, Q′(E,ω′) = 1 because Π′(ω′) ⊆ E. This
implies that E ∈ G ′, for G ′ contains every event F such that Q′(F, ω′) = 1. This
contradicts to the assumption that E 6∈ G ′.
The above theorem shows that after completing each σ-algebra G with respect
to a proper regular conditional probability measure Q (defined jointly by G and
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µ), the σ-algebra G uniquely determines a partition Π.
Our result, which is based on the technique of posterior-completion, provide
a different result from HM regarding what is a partition that preserves the
informational content of the sub-σ-algebra in Billingsley’s example.
Example 8. Consider the following σ-algebra G in Billingsley’s example:
G = {E ∈ F| either E or ¬E is countable}.
The posterior-completion of G is thus F which is the Borel σ-algebra. The
partition generated from this posterior-completed σ-algebra F is the partition
that contains every singleton. This is, in fact, the partition that generates G.
Remark 3. Recall that in HM, the partition claimed to have the same infor-
mational content as G is the coarsest partition Π′ = {Ω}. Notice that G is the
smallest σ-algebra generated by the finest partition Π = {{ω}|ω ∈ Ω}. As G
contains every singleton, a DM can distinguish each state from the other. This
is the information that G inherits from the partition Π. However, HM’s treat-
ment of G ignores this information, while focusing solely on the information
provided by the uniform probability distribution. On the other hand, our treat-
ment requires the informational content of G to come from both the partition
Π and the uniform probability distribution conditioned on Π, as one usually
defines a conditional probability. The information contained in Π is not lost,
thus implying that the DM is fully informed of which state occurs. Hence, the
informational content of G must be equal to the underlying event space, which
is the Borel σ-algebra F .
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we establish an equivalent relationship between partitions and
σ-algebras as formalizations of information, and equip the notion of an infor-
mational content with a precise and intuitive meaning by viewing it through
the two different but related notions of knowledge and belief. Although both
a partition and a σ-algebra have been prevalently used to formally represent
information, there has only been a vague understanding about the relationship
between the two. However, Billingsley (1995) and Dubra and Echenique (2004)
raise a concern about the use of σ-algebra by coming up with an example in
which a partition and the σ-algebra generated by it fail to contain the same
informational content.
Hervés-Beloso and Monteiro (2013) engage this example and elaborate on
the meaning of information. They provide a notion of an informed set, and
suggest the two alternative methods: one for generating a σ-algebra from a par-
tition and the other for going in the opposite direction. However, we find out
that their suggestion still leaves the meaning of information ambiguous. When
it comes to a partition, the information content captured by the notion of an
informed set depends neither on a given measurable space nor on a probability
measure. On the other hand, for a given σ-algebra, the informational content,
in general, relies on a specific choice of a probability measure. Even when infor-
mation content is captured by a countably-generated σ-algebra, HM are silent
about whether or not it is a collection of all informed sets for some partition.
By separating the notion of information into the two notions of knowledge
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and belief, we elaborate on the meaning of information in relation to a proba-
bility measure. The two notions are distinct regarding whether the concept of
information is required to satisfy the truthfulness or not. If one allows for fal-
sity, the notion one works with is that of belief. We show that a proper regular
conditional probability, and the posterior completion of a partition/a σ-algebra
correspond to this conception of information. Specifically, the presence of null
events captures the possible falsity of information. Based on the conception of
information as belief, we show that partitions and σ-algebras can be equiva-
lently used after applying the technique of the posterior-completion proposed
by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987). The idea behind posterior completion is
to add in null events to a partition (or a σ-algebra) to generate a new partition
(a new σ-algebra) that allows a DM to incorporate the possibility of falsity in
his information. On the other hand, if the concept of information is based on
knowledge, information must be independent of one’s belief (which is captured
by a probability measure). In this case, we show that only measurable partitions
and countably-generated σ-algebras can be equivalently used.
We conclude that although the distinction between knowledge and belief
matters for the equivalence between partitions and σ-algebras when formalizing
information either by a partition or by a σ-algebra, one can safely assume infor-
mation as belief in a practical sense. In almost all economic models, a partition
or a σ-algebra is equipped with a probability measure to formalize information
of a DM. Therefore, the only thing one needs to make sure is to apply posterior








The question of whether individuals are able to achieve an efficient allocation
has been central in economics. With complete information, the answer is likely
to be positive. If a currently given allocation, the so-called status quo alloca-
tion, is inefficient, some individual may propose another allocation that would
make him better off without making others worse off. As Coase (1960) argues,
other individuals would accept the proposal unless the cost of bargaining is
substantial.
In an economy with incomplete information, the conclusion is less likely to
be true. Even when the proposed allocation leads to a Pareto improvement,
individuals may reject the proposal. Behind this seemingly puzzling argument
lies the possibility that the act of proposing itself reveals the proposer’s private
information, and thus reverses the preferences of individuals. Noticing this
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possibility, Wilson (1978) proposes two notions of efficiency in economies with
incomplete information by requiring both notions to satisfy no revelation of
private information. That is, an allocation is efficient unless there exists a
common knowledge event on which another allocation Pareto-dominates it.
Holmström and Myerson (1983) (henceforth, HM) elaborate on Wilson’s no-
tions further by identifying three different issues embedded in them: one about
defining the notion of efficiency in the presence of privation information, another
about whether each individual would follow a decision rule sincerely, so-called
incentive compatibility, and the last one about the condition under which an
incentive compatible and efficient (in short, incentive efficient) decision rule1
would be implemented without revealing any private information of individu-
als.
Using this tripartite separation, HM define the notion of efficiency analo-
gously to the case with complete information. A decision rule is efficient if
there is no other decision rule that every individual, conditional on her private
information, prefers to it. Accordingly, to ask whether a decision rule is in-
centive efficient is not the same as to ask whether such a decision rule can be
implemented without the possibility of information revelation. In other words,
there may exist an incentive efficient decision rule that is implementable through
some information revelation.
Surprisingly, however, HM show that an incentive compatible decision rule
is incentive efficient if and only if there does not exist any common knowledge
event that such a decision rule is dominated by another incentive compatible
1In the interim stage, each individual does not know the others’ information, thus what
an individual proposes is not merely an allocation, rather a decision rule that specifies an
allocation for each state of information that all individuals might have privately.
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decision rule2. This implies that checking for efficiency on common knowledge
events is sufficient to determine an incentive efficient decision rule. This saves
one the effort of considering all possible events. Due to this advantage, it has
been widely utilized in various contexts. For example, Vohra (1999) states the
following:
“...it is enough for the objecting coalition to be able to improve
upon the status-quo over a discernible event3. For the grand coali-
tion,...The argument follows from Theorem 1 of Holmström and Myerson
(1983).4”
In this paper, we find that the definition of common knowledge event,
which HM use to prove their result, is unnecessarily restrictive in light of
the standard definition originating in Aumann (1976). Specifically, by apply-
ing Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) (henceforth BD)’s definition of common
knowledge events5, we show that there are more common knowledge events
that are not accounted for in HM’s definition. The class of common knowledge
events is larger with BD’s definition than with HM’s. This naturally leads to a
question whether the assertion in Theorem 1 of HM still holds if BD’s definition
of common knowledge events applies. We argue that the answer is positive.
Replacing HM’s definition of common knowledge events by BD’s may raise
2This is the statement of Theorem 1 of HM.
3A discernible event in Vohra (1999) is equivalent to a common knowledge event in
Holmström and Myerson (1983).
4Vohra (1999), p.130
5Our specific choice of BD’s definition comes out of our concerns that Aumann’s definition
does not admit a direct comparison with HM’s definition. The latter depends on a probability
measure, while the former does not. BD extend Aumann’s definition to accounts for a proba-
bility measure, thus addressing our concerns. Due to its dependence on a probability measure,
BD’s definition is often referred to as common belief with probability 1 to differentiate it from
Aumann’s definition.
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concerns that it actually weakens HM’s result by increasing the burden of check-
ing for efficiency. However, we argue that such apparent burdens can be safely
disregarded. We need only check for efficiency in a strict subset of common
knowledge events known as self-evident events. Furthermore, the class of self-
evident events is the minimal class of events that one needs to check. When
applying BD’s definition to HM’s model of an economy with incomplete infor-
mation (which we refer to as HM economy), a self-evident event is the small-
est event among all the common knowledge events containing a set of non-null
states. This implies that any common knowledge event larger than a self-evident
event necessarily contains a null state. If one individual proposes a change from
the status quo decision rule to an incentive compatible decision rule that makes
himself better off without hurting the others at such a null state, then the other
individuals would come to know the proposer’s type immediately.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we begin with a descrip-
tion of the economy with incomplete information as suggested by HM. We also
present BD’s definition of common knowledge events, and in Section 3, by ap-
plying it to HM economy, we compare HM’s definition with BD’s. In Section 4,
we present our main result. Finally in Section 5, we conclude.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Environment
In this section, we present the description of an economy with incomplete infor-
mation and the notion of an incentive efficient decision rule with the relevant
definitions by closely following HM.
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Economy Let I = {1, 2, ..., N} be a nonempty finite set of agents. Each
agent i has private information, type which takes a value from a finite set Ti.
An information state (or simply a state) is thus a type profile t ∈ T = ∏i∈I Ti.
Let T−i be a set defined by T−i =
∏
j 6=i Tj. Let F be a σ-algebra on T , which we
refer to as an event space, and let pi be a prior probability measure associated
with agent i. Then, pi(E) denotes the prior belief of agent i about an event
E ∈ F . For notational convenience, we shall write pi(t) to mean pi({t}). We
assume that all the agents agree on events with zero prior probability: For every
agent i and an event E ∈ F , pi(E) = 0 implies that pj(E) = 0 for all j 6= i.
Therefore, we shall refer to an event that occurs with zero probability as a null
event.
For a type profile t = (ti, t−i) ∈ T , agent i cannot distinguish type profiles
t̂ = (ti, t̂−i). We thus define agent i’s information partition P i = {P i(t)|t ∈ T}
such that P i(t) = {t̂ ∈ T : t̂ = (ti, t̂−i)}. The partition cell P i(t) is the set
of states indistinguishable to agent i. In other words, the agent at least knows
that the true state does not lie outside P i(t).
Let F i be the smallest σ-algebra generated by P i, and qi : F ×T → [0, 1] be
a conditional probability measure. Then, qi(E, t) denote agent i’s interim belief
about how likely an event E is to occur at a state t, and this can be calculated






Note that qi(E, t) can be an arbitrary number in [0, 1] if pi(P
i(t)) = 0, i.e.
prior belief about agent i’s type being ti is zero. However, there are cases where
assigning an arbitrary number is somewhat counterintuitive. Consider a case
where P i(t) ⊆ E. Once agent i’s type is realized to be ti, the agent knows for
sure that the event E occurs. Naturally, this intuition tells that qi(E, t) = 1.
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Moreover, if P i(t) lies outside E, then it seems that we must specify qi(E, t) = 0
because if the state t were to realize, the agent would know for sure that E does
not occur. Therefore, we formally impose the following property on qi(E, t):
Assumption 1. A conditional probability qi of an agent i is proper: for each
t ∈ T , qi(E, t) = 1E(t) for each E ∈ F i, where 1E(t) = 1 if t ∈ E and 0
otherwise.
For notational convenience, we denote pi(t̂−i|ti) to be the proper conditional
probability that i would assign to a singleton event t̂ = (ti, t̂−i) if her own type
is ti and the realized state is t, i.e. pi(t̂−i|ti) = qi({t̂}, t)6.
Let D0 be a finite set of feasible decisions, and let D be the set of probability
distributions over D0. The preference of each agent i ∈ I is given by von
Neumann-Morgenstein utility function ui(·, t) : D −→ R. Then, the economy is
completely specified by a list (I,D0, {Ti}i∈I , {pi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I).
Incentive efficient decision rule Let δ : T −→ D be a decision rule, and let
∆ be a collection of decision rule. Then, the payoff of an agent i of type ti under
a decision rule δ is defined as Ui(δ|ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i pi(t−i|ti)ui(δ(t), t). We first
introduce the following: A decision rule γ dominates δ at t if Ui(γ|ti) ≥ Ui(γ|ti)
for all i ∈ I and Uj(γ|tj) ≥ Uj(γ|tj) for some j at t. Moreover, for a nonempty
event R ⊆ T , γ dominates δ within R if it dominates at every t ∈ R. If R = T ,
we say simply that γ dominates δ. Given the notion of dominance, one may
define interim efficiency simply by a undominated decision rule as in the case of
complete information. For convenience, we shall drop the term ‘interim’ unless
it is necessary in all what follows.




Definition 13 (Efficiency). A decision rule δ is efficient (in the interim sense)
if there is no decision rule γ that dominates δ.
Definition 14 (Incentive Compatibility). A decision rule δ is said to be incen-
tive compatible for i if
Ui(δ|ti) ≥ Ui(δ, t̂i|ti) ≡
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t−i|ti)ui(δ(t−i, t̂i), t) for ∀ti ∈ Ti,∀t̂i ∈ Ti.
Moreover, a decision rule δ is incentive compatible if δ is incentive compatible
for all i ∈ I.
For later use, we shall denote the set of incentive compatible decision rules
by ∆∗ ⊂ ∆.
Definition 15 (Interim Efficient Decision Rule). A decision rule δ is incentive
efficient if δ is incentive compatible and efficient.
2.2.2 Knowledge, Common Knowledge, and Self-Evident
Event
In this subsection, we introduce essential concepts regarding a common knowl-
edge event following mainly Brandenburger and Dekel (1987). Before we begin,
recall that we are given a measurable space (T,F) equipped with each agent i’s
(prior) probability measure pi. The information structure of an agent i is given
by a partition P i or, equivalently, by the smallest σ-algebra F i by the partition.
Moreover, we denote a proper regular conditional probability by qi.
Consider an event E ∈ F and a state t ∈ T . We shall formalize a sentence
like “An agent i knows E at t” by qi(E, t) = 1. We wish to emphasize that the
presence of null events may cause a trouble in appropriately defining the notion
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of an common knowledge event. This is exactly the concern Brandenburger-
Dekel address. They argue that one need to add in events that are null in
the sense of proper regular conditional probability, to the information partition
or the corresponding σ-algebra. This requirement is often called as posterior
completion. We formally state it as follows:
Definition 16 (posterior completion). The posterior completion of a σ-algebra
F i is a σ-algebra generated by F i and the class of events {G ∈ F|qi(G, t) =
0 for every t ∈ T}. The resulting σ-algebra is said to be the posterior-completed
σ-algebra, and denoted by F̂ i.
One may define the posterior completion of a partition as follows: Let P i
be a partition, which is the collection of atoms of a σ-algebra F i. Then, the
posterior completion of P i is simply the collection of atoms of the posterior
completed σ-algebra F̂ i, and denoted by P̂ i.
Definition 17 (Knowledge). For a probability space (T,F , pi), define a function
Ki : F −→ F̂ i such that for every event E ∈ F ,
Ki(E) = {t|qi(E, t) = 1}.
Then, Ki is said to be a knowledge function. Moreover, an agent i ∈ I is said
to know that an event E occurs at a state t if t ∈ Ki(E).
We say that an event F ∈ F is non-null in a posterior sense if for an agent
i, qi(F, t) > 0 for every t ∈ T .
Definition 18 (self-evident event and common knowledge event). An event
F ∈ F is said to be self-evident if Ki(F ) = F for all i ∈ I. That is, F is a
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non-null (in a posterior sense) member of ∩iF̂ i. For t ∈ T , an event E is a
common knowledge event at a state t if there is a self-evident event F such that
t ∈ F and F ⊆ E7.
We may state the above definition in terms of partitions. To do this, we
define the following: A partition P is a coarsening of a partition P ′ (or P ′ is
a refinement of P) if for each Pk ∈ P , there exists a set κ ⊆ {1, 2, ....} such
that {P ′m}m∈κ constitutes a partition of Pk. The join is the coarsest common
refinement of partitions {P i}i∈I , and denoted by ∨i∈IP i. The meet is the finest
common coarsening of partitions {P i}i∈I , and denoted by ∧i∈IP i.
Lemma 9. An event F ∈ F is self-evident if and only if it is a non-null (in a
posterior sense) member of the meet ∧i∈IP̂ i.
The proof is trivial by the relationship between a posterior-completed par-
tition and a posterior-completed σ-algebra.
2.3 Characterization of Common Knowledge Event
In an economy E , characterizing self-evident events and common knowledge
events according to the definitions in the previous section is cumbersome. We
thus characterize them in terms of pi(t̂−i|ti) for direct comparison with HM.
Lemma 10. An event F is a self-evident event if and only if for any t =
(ti, t−i) ∈ F and any i ∈ I, F satisfies the following:
7In the original definition by BD that also allows for an infinite (possibly uncountable)
number of states, the self-evident event F needs to be contained in the event E almost surely,
i.e. qi(F \ E, t) = 0. However, in the HM economy where the state space is finite, this
condition is equivalent to the condition that the self-evident F is a subset of E.
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1. Posterior beliefs are zero outside F : pi(t̂−i|ti) = 0 for ∀t̂ = (ti, t̂−i) 6∈ F ,
and
2. Posterior beliefs are non-zero within F : pi(t̃−i|ti) > 0 for ∀t̃ = (ti, t̃−i) ∈
F .
E is a common knowledge event at a state t if and only if there is a self-evident
event F such that t ∈ F and F ⊆ E. Moreover, we say that E is a common
knowledge event if there exists t ∈ E at which it is a common knowledge event.
Proof. If there exists no null events, it is trivial. Hence, suppose that there
exists a null event, i.e. there exists a state t ∈ T such that pi(t) = 0 for
all i. Take any t ∈ F and any i ∈ I. Suppose that both conditions hold.
Then, qi(F, t) > 0 by the second condition. Moreover, qi(F, t) = 1 by the first
condition. Hence, F is a non-null member of the meet,i.e., self-evident event.
For the other direction, suppose that F is a self-evident event. Take any t ∈ F
and any i ∈ I. Then, qi(F, t) = 1. Take any t̃ = (ti, t̃−i) ∈ F . Then, t̃ ∈ P̂ i(t),
which implies the second condition. Take any t̂ = (ti, t̂−i) 6∈ F . t̂ ∈ P i(t) implies
that qi({t̂}, t) = 0. This satisfies the first condition. The characterization of a
common knowledge event is obvious by its definition.
One should be cautious that a common knowledge event E may not be a
common knowledge event at some state t ∈ E.
Corollary 1. Let t ∈ T be given, and let E be a common knowledge event.
Then, the event E is a common knowledge event at t if and only if t ∈ F for
some self-evident event F ⊆ E. That is, if the state lies outside any self-evident
events, the event E is not a common knowledge event at such a state t.
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Proof. By definition of a common knowledge event, “If ” part is trivial. For
the other direction, suppose that the state t does not belong to any self-evident
event F contained in E, i.e. t 6∈ F for all F ⊆ E. Suppose further to the
contrary that E is a common knowledge event at t. Then, by Lemma 10 above,
there exists a self-evident event F ′ such that t ∈ F ′ and F ′ ⊆ E. This leads to
a contradiction that t does not belong to any self-evident event.
The above corollary implies that a self-evident event contains all the infor-
mation required to determine a common knowledge event.
Now, we compare our characterization with the one proposed by HM. For
this purpose, we present HM’s characterization of common knowledge events
(Lemma 1 of HM) in the name of HM common knowledge to avoid the confusion
with ours.
Definition 19 (HM Common Knowledge Event). An E is a common knowledge
event in the sense of HM, or simply HM common knowledge event, if and only
if E is of the form E =
∏
i∈I Ei, where each Ei ⊆ Ti, and
pi(t̂−i|ti) = 0 for ∀ti,∀t̂ = (ti, t̂−i) 6∈ E,∀i.
The above condition implies that a HM common knowledge event E is a
rectangular event satisfying that the conditional probability is degenerate on
for every event F such that F ∩E = ∅ and Fi = Ei for some i ∈ I. Notice that
it requires no condition inside the event.
It is immediate that if an event is a HM common knowledge event, then it is
a common knowledge event. However, the converse does not hold. We provide
an example showing that there exists a common knowledge event that is not
rectangular.
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Example 9. Consider the case where there are two agents and two types for
each agent. Then, T = {11, 12, 21, 22} where mn = (tm1 , tn2 ). Let the prior
probabilities for each agent be pi({22}) = 0 for all i = 1, 2. Then, the partitions
of agents are given as P1 = {{11, 12}, {21, 22}} and P2 = {{11, 21}, {12, 22}}.
By posterior completion, {22} should be added in to both agents’ partitions.
Then, the posterior-completed partitions and their meet are the followings:
P̂1 = {{11, 12}, {21}, {22}}, P̂2 = {{11, 21}, {12}, {22}}, and P̂1 ∧ P̂2 = {{11, 12, 21}, {22}}
{11, 12, 21} is a non-null (in a posterior sense) member of the meet and thus a
self-evident event. Denote this event by E = {11, 12, 21}. Then, E is a common
knowledge event at t = 11. However, it is not a HM common knowledge event:
There is no Ei ⊆ Ti for i = 1, 2 such that E = E1 × E2.
In relation to a self-evident event, we can also see easily that if an event is a
self-evident event, then it is a HM common knowledge event, but the converse
does not hold.
Example 10. Consider the same setting as Example 9 except that pi({t}) = 0
for all t = 12, 21, 22 and for all i = 1, 2. The properness of the posterior
probability requires q1({21, 22}, t) = 1 for t = 21, 22 and q2({12, 22}, t) = 1 for
t = 12, 22. Note that neither agent 1’s posterior beliefs for any singleton event
in {21, 22} nor agent 2’s posterior beliefs for any singleton event in {12, 22} can
be calculated by Bayes’ rule. Hence, those posterior beliefs can be determined
in an arbitrary manner. Assume that q1({21}, t) = 0.5 for t = 21, 22 and
q2({12}, t) = 0.5 for t = 12, 22. In other words, p1(t2 = 1|t1 = 2) = 0.5 and
p2(t1 = 1|t2 = 2) = 0.5. Then, {12} should be added in to agent 1’s partition
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while {21} should be added in to agent 2’s partition. Then, the posterior-
completed partitions and their meet are the followings:
P̂1 = {{11}, {12}, {21, 22}}, P̂2 = {{11}, {21}, {12, 22}}, and P̂1 ∧ P̂2 = {{11}, {12, 21, 22}}
{11} is a non-null (in a posterior sense) member of the meet and then a self-
evident event. Let E = {11, 12}. E is clearly a HM common knowledge event.
However, it is not a self-evident event.
We shall simply summarize the result by the following lemma.
Lemma 11. Let S, HM, and C be the collection of all self-evident events, all
HM common knowledge events, and all common knowledge events, respectively.
Then, we have the following:
(a) S ⊂ HM ⊂ C
(b) S = HM = C = F if and only if pi(t) > 0 for all i ∈ I and all t ∈ T , i.e.
there exists no null event.
The proof is obvious by Lemma 10 and Definition 19.
2.4 Common Knowledge and Incentive Efficient
Decision Rule
HM in Theorem 1 of their work shows that one needs to inspect HM common
knowledge events to find out an incentive efficient decision rule. This is indeed a
powerful result for it actually reduces the number of incentive compatible deci-
sion rules to consider. Specifically, suppose that we are considering an incentive
compatible decision rule δ as a candidate for an incentive efficient decision rule.
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By the result proved by HM, it is not necessary to consider an incentive com-
patible decision rule γ that dominates δ outside common knowledge events. By
Lemma 11, we see that this does not work if there exists no null event. In what
follows, we thus assume the following:
Assumption 2. There exists a null event E ∈ F such that pi(E) = 0 for all i.
Now, we recast Theorem 1 of HM to see how it reduces the number of events
to consider to find out an incentive efficient decision rule.
For simplicity of presentation, we shall define the following notation: For an
incentive compatible decision rule δ ∈ ∆∗ and an event E ∈ F , let ∆∗(δ, E) ⊂
∆∗ to denote the set of all incentive compatible decision rules that dominates δ
within the event E:
∆∗(δ, E) = {γ ∈ ∆∗|γ 6= δ and γ dominates δ within E}
Then, it satisfies the following properties: For E,F ∈ F
• ∆∗(δ, E ∪ F ) = ∆∗(δ, E) ∩∆∗(δ, F )
• E ⊆ F implies ∆∗(δ, F ) ⊆ ∆∗(δ, E)
Theorem 3 (HM Theorem 1). An incentive compatible decision rule δ is in-
terim incentive efficient if and only if there does not exist any HM common
knowledge event E such that δ is interim dominated within E by another incentive-
compatible decision rule:
∆∗(δ, T ) = ∅ ⇐⇒ ∩{∆∗(δ, E)|E ∈ HM} = ∅
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One can clearly see that ∩{∆∗(δ, E)|E ∈ HM} ⊂ ∆∗(δ, T ) because HM ⊂
F . As we argued in the previous section, HM’s result is based on a somewhat ar-
bitrarily restrictive definition of common knowledge events. A natural question
is whether the same result holds if we replace HM definition with our definition
in Lemma 10. The answer is positive.
Theorem 4. An incentive compatible decision rule δ is interim incentive effi-
cient if and only if there does not exist any common knowledge event E such
that δ is interim dominated within E by another incentive-compatible decision
rule:
∆∗(δ, T ) = ∅ ⇐⇒ ∩{∆∗(δ, E)|E ∈ C} = ∅
The proof is trivial, for T itself is a common knowledge event. Therefore,
the above theorem does not reduce the number of events we need to check for
efficiency to determine an incentive efficient decision rule.
Is there any way to reduce the number of events further than to consider
HM common knowledge events? The answer is positive as illustrated by the
following example:
Example 11. Consider the same setting as in Example 10. Let E = {11, 12}.
Then, E is a HM common knowledge event. Moreover, it is a common knowledge
event only at t = 11. Suppose that there are only two incentive compatible
decision rules, ∆∗ = {δ, γ}, such that Ui(γ(11), 11) = Ui(δ(11), 11) for all i =
1, 2, U1(γ|t1 = 2) < U1(δ|t1 = 2), U2(γ|t2 = 2) > U2(δ|t2 = 2), U2(γ(12), 12) <
U2(δ(12), 12) and U2(γ(22), 22) > U2(δ(22), 22). We first argue that within a
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HM common knowledge event E, γ dominates δ because
U1(γ|t1 = 1) = U1(δ|t1 = 1), U1(γ|t1 = 2) < U1(δ|t1 = 2),
U2(γ|t2 = 1) = U1(δ|t2 = 1), U2(γ|t2 = 2) > U2(δ|t2 = 2).
However, it suffices to consider F = {11}. At state t = 12, it is not common
knowledge that γ dominates δ. Specifically, suppose that the two agents are
considering a change from δ to γ. By the specification of the utility function,
both agents would gain by agree with the change. Note, however, that E is
not a common knowledge event at t = 12. Then, if both agents were to agree
with the change, agent 2 would know that the agent 1’s type is t1 = 1 because if
agent 1 with t1 = 2 would have objected the change. Now, p2(t1 = 1|t2 = 2) = 1
and agent 2 would want to repeal her consent to the change. Hence, in fear of
this, the agent 1 would object to the change when asked for a consent. That is,
γ will not be chosen over δ even though the former dominates the latter on E.
To reiterate, it suffices to consider F = {11}.
In the above example, even when E is a HM common knowledge event, it
suffices to check for efficiency on a smaller event F to see that γ is incentive
efficient. This shows that if there exists a null state t ∈ E such that E is not
a common knowledge event at t, then there is always a room for the possibility
that an agent’s proposal would reveal his information.
We thus argue that one may determine an incentive efficient decision rule
only by checking for efficiency on the self-evident events. Moreover, this is the
maximum extent to which one may reduce the number of events for the job of
finding out an incentive efficient decision rule.
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Theorem 5. An incentive compatible decision rule δ is interim incentive effi-
cient if and only if there does not exist any self-evident event E such that δ is
interim dominated within E by another incentive-compatible decision rule:
∆∗(δ, T ) = ∅ ⇐⇒ ∩{∆∗(δ, E)|E ∈ S} = ∅.
Proof. By ∩{∆∗(δ, E)|E ∈ S} ⊂ ∆∗(δ, T ), “only if ” part is trivial. For the
other direction, suppose that ∩{∆∗(δ, E)|E ∈ S} = ∅ but ∆∗(δ, T ) 6= ∅. Then,
there exists γ ∈ ∆∗(δ, T ), i.e γ dominates δ. For any self-evident event E,
∆∗(δ, E) = ∅: there exists no incentive compatible decision rule that dom-
inates δ within every self-evident event E. Hence, γ does not dominate δ
within ∪{E|E ∈ S}. Then, there exists an agent j ∈ I and a state t 6∈
∪{E|E ∈ S} such that Uj(γ|tj) > Uj(δ|tj). Since the state t lies outside ev-
ery self-evident event, the posterior probability must be degenerate at t. That
is, pj(t−j|tj) = 0. This implies that Uj(γ|tj) = pj(t−j|tj)uj(γ(t), t) = 0 =
Uj(δ|tj) = pj(t−j|tj)uj(δ(t), t), which is a contradiction.
Corollary 2. The class of self-evident events S is the minimal class of events
among the classes of events G satisfying the following condition:
∆∗(δ, T ) = ∅ ⇐⇒ ∩{∆∗(δ, E)|E ∈ G} = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a class of events G ⊂ S satisfying ∆∗(δ, T ) =
∅ ⇐⇒ ∩{∆∗(δ, E)|E ∈ G} = ∅, i.e. δ is incentive efficient if and only if
there exists no other incentive compatible decision rule that dominates δ within
any event E ∈ G. Then, there exists a self-evident event F ∈ S such that
F 6∈ G. Suppose that ∆∗(δ, F ) 6= ∅. This implies that there exists an incentive
compatible decision rule γ that dominates δ in F . Since F is a self-evident
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event, it is also a common knowledge event that γ dominates δ at every t ∈ F .
This leads to a contradiction, because δ is not incentive efficient.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the idea originating in Wilson (1978) that in order
to determine whether an incentive compatible decision rule is efficient or not,
one need only check whether it is common knowledge that there exists another
incentive compatible decision rule that dominates it. HM show that this idea
is indeed valid. By giving a close examination, however, we find that their
definition of common knowledge is arbitrarily restrictive, when comparing it
with the standard definition of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987). There are
more common knowledge events that are not accounted for in HM’s definition.
This weakens HM’s result by increasing the number of events on which we need
to check for efficiency in order to determine an incentive compatible and efficient
decision rule. However, we argue that HM’s result can actually be strengthened.
We argue that it is sufficient to consider a strict subset of a common knowledge
event, known as self-evident events. Moreover, this is the minimal class of events
one need to check. As every self-evident event consists of non-null states, our
result suggests that one may safely assume that every state is non-null in a
finite state space model (like HM economy), when working with the purpose of







Third-party mediation is one of the most commonly used technique for resolv-
ing international conflicts (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2008, p.5). In particular,
it has become commonplace since the end of World War II (Frazier and Dixon,
2006, p.395)1. Growing reliance on mediation as a mean for conflict resolution
naturally raises a question of what makes for a successful mediation. Particu-
larly, third party’s impartiality, or “even-handedness” has been emphasized to
1Although the number varies across the databases, the incidence of the third-party media-
tion (or simply mediation) accounts for about a 30 to 40 percent rate. The variation depends
on the definition of conflicts as well as the time periods considered in databases. For example,
the International Crisis Behavior(ICB) database defines a conflict broadly as a situation in
which there exists only some perceived threat of increased hostilities. In the ICB database,
out of the 434 conflicts that occurred between 1918 and 2001, only 128 conflicts (30 per-
cents) experienced the third-party mediation. The International Conflict Management(ICM)
database, however, defines a conflict in a more restrictive sense: it must involve a significant
use of force and/or some fatalities. According to the ICM database that identifies 104 bilateral
interstate conflicts between 1965 and 1995, the mediation occurred in 40 conflicts.
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be crucial by scholars and practitioners2: A disputant, facing a mediator who
is biased against him, would be less willing to accept the mediator’s recom-
mendation. Even worse, anticipating such a circumstance, he would not agree
to initiate mediation in the first place. Nonetheless, mediators are often bi-
ased: The United States in the Falkland island war and the Soviet Union in the
Vietnam war are just two of many available examples.
The literature on this subject provides an explanation by arguing either
that a biased mediator may resolve conflicts better than a unbiased one (Kydd,
2003), or that there is a shortage of unbiased third parties (Beardsley, 2006;
Beber, 2012). Nevertheless, the literature is silent as to why a disputant ac-
cepts a biased mediator in the first place, and behind this silence lies a naive
understanding that a disputant would accept mediation if it is likely to be ef-
fective. However, peace is not the end itself for a disputant, but merely a mean
to increase his own welfare.
The purpose of this paper is to address this issue by answering the following
questions: “Why, and under which circumstances would disputants accept a
biased mediator? If accepted, is such a mediator as effective in promoting
peace as an unbiased one?” To this end, we build a simple model of mediator
selection where each disputant, facing a potentially biased mediator, makes a
decision to accept mediation or not. If both disputants agree, such a mediator
would make a recommendation, as a mechanism designer, to disputants about
2For example, the United Nations single out impartiality as a corner-
stone of mediation, without which any meaningful resolution of the conflict
is hampered. See United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012),
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for
%20Effective%20Mediation.pdf. Moreover, even when individual nations are involved, they
usually issue public avowals of impartiality as the United States in the Middle East and in
the Falkland Islands Crisis of 1982 (Smith, 1985).
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which action to take and how to divide the contested resources between the
two parties. Otherwise, disputants are engaged in a situation in which each
disputant chooses whether to start a war or not. In either case, each disputant’s
decision may reveal his private information.
The novelty of our model is to introduce mediator bias. Unlike the case of
mechanism design problems that assume a unbiased mediator whose sole pur-
pose is to promote peace (Fey and Ramsay, 2010; Hörner et al., 2015) (hence-
forth HMS), an optimal mechanism does not treat disputants symmetrically.
Therefore, one cannot simply restrict his attention to the type-dependent con-
straints by ignoring the identities of each disputant. Specifically, when it comes
to a disputant favored by a mediator, it is not easy to figure out whether a
participation constraint or an incentive compatibility constraint does or does
not bind at the optimum.
We begin our analysis by revealing how an optimal mechanism, if proposed
by a biased mediator, differs from the one by an unbiased mediator. We find
that a biased mediator allocates more resources to her ally, while giving the
opponent more chances to enjoy a peaceful outcome (Corollary 3). This differ-
ential treatment arises, for a biased mediator must give an information rent to
the disfavored party. There are two options: to raise the peace probabilities or
to raise the share for the disfavored party. These two options affect the welfare
of the favored party differently. The former benefits both parties by saving the
resources that might have been wasted under war. The latter, however, does
harm to the favored party. The biased mediator would then choose the cheaper
way of allocating more peace probabilities to the disfavored party.
When turning to the occurrence of mediation, we find that if the likelihood
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of peace is low in a conflict, a biased mediator is accepted by disputants as long
as her bias is moderate (Theorem 7). As a conflict is less likely to end up with
a peaceful outcome, disputants are willing to accept a mediator with a more
extreme level of bias. This is because a weak disputant has a stronger incentive
to pretend to be strong in order to induce his opponent not to attack him.
This, in turn, increases the amount of an informational rent a biased mediator
must provide to the disfavored party under mediation. As mediation is now
more attractive, the disfavored party would accept mediation even when the
mediator’s bias is more extreme.
More importantly, we argue that a biased mediator, accepted by both dis-
putants, is equally effective as an unbiased one (Theorem 6). An immediate
implication is that if accepted, the peace probability attained by such a media-
tor is independent of the intensity of her bias. This is striking because a biased
mediator is not interested in the peaceful resolution of a conflict per se unlike an
unbiased one. Then, how does a biased mediator end up with achieving peace
as effectively as unbiased one? A biased mediator may gain from promoting
peace. By saving the resources that might have been wasted under war, she can
allocate more resources to the favored party under peace. However, the gains
from promoting peace is necessarily followed by the cost of providing a larger
amount of the informational rent to the disfavored party. If moderately biased,
a mediator finds the cost negligible. Consequently, she ends up with promoting
peace as an unbiased mediator does.
We contribute to the literature on mediator bias by showing that mediator
bias is not harmful in achieving peace, if one considers the endogenous selection
of a mediator by disputants. Although Kydd (2003) reach the similar conclusion,
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his result requires that the mediator possesses information that is not available
to the disputants3. More importantly, Kydd considers a model in which a
mediator is exogenously given. Contrarily, our result holds without assuming the
private information that a mediator possesses about the disputants. Moreover,
as it is highlighted, we contribute to the literature by studying the demand side
of mediation that has been largely conceived to play a little role in explaining
why a biased third party acts as a mediator.
In relation to the literature that adopts a mechanism-design theoretic ap-
proach to mediation, we contribute by investigating how an optimal mechanism
changes when the mediator (or the mechanism designer) is biased in favor of one
disputant. The literature assumes a unbiased mediator who seeks to maximize
the peace probability. As we discussed, the optimal mechanism offered by a
biased mediator is qualitatively different from the one by an unbiased mediator.
Moreover, we contribute by dealing with the technical challenge as to whether
a participation constraint or an incentive compatibility constraint does or does
not bind at the optimum, when it comes to a disputant favored by a mediator.
To be specific, the difficulty of solving for an optimal mechanism in our
model can be easily seen by comparing the technique used in HMS under the
assumption of an unbiased mediator. Our model extends their mechanism de-
sign problem by allowing for mediator bias, and thus admits a direct comparison
with HMS. By utilizing the unbiasedness of a mediator, HMS imposes symmetry
3Kydd challenge the negative view about mediator bias by arguing that if a mediator
has a privileged access to the information that one disputant is weaker than his opponent,
she may persuade the weaker disputant to make a concession to the opponent by providing
such information more credibly when she is biased in favor of the weaker disputant than
when she is unbiased. This argument initially comes from Touval (1975), and Kydd formalize
the argument by highlighting the role of a mediator in providing information. For more
discussions, see Smith (1985), Touval (1975), and Favretto (2009)
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on the choice variables while specifying a value to some choice variables through
an educated guess. They thus simplify the problem into a linear programming
problem in one variable. This technique does not work for our model.
We thus proceed by simplifying the problem into a linear programming prob-
lem in four variables that are related only to the peace probabilities. We then
treat the problem as if one disputant’s type is known, and solve for the two vari-
ables as expressions of the other two variables. The expressions are piecewise
linear in the two probability variables, and we solve for an optimal mechanism
by depicting them geometrically on the space of the two probability variables.
Although our model concerns a mediation problem in the context of interna-
tional conflict, it may also apply to a various bargaining problem with incom-
plete information that arises in, for example, trade disputes and litigation cases.
Therefore, our technique may apply to analyze these problems when the medi-
ator is potentially biased toward one party.
This paper is organized in the following order. Section 2 formally introduces
a model of mediator selection. Section 3 presents an optimal mechanism, reveal-
ing how differently a biased mediator mediates from an unbiased one. Section
4 , concludes the paper by discussing implications of the main result and po-




3.2.1 A Model of Conflict: War-and-Peace game
This subsection presents a simple model of international conflicts, so-called War-
and-Peace game, following the setup suggested by HMS(2015). Two countries
or disputants i = 1, 2 are in conflict with each other over a pie of which size is
normalized to one. In peace, each disputant owns the half of the pie. Each dis-
putant may take an action among the two alternatives, attacking his opponent,
‘Attack’ and staying in peace, ‘Stay’. Let ai ∈ {S,A} denote an action taken by
disputant i, where A denotes ‘Attack’ and S denotes ‘Stay’. If either disputant
chooses to attack his opponent, war breaks out between the two disputants and
the size of pie shrinks to θ < 1. Otherwise, both disputants stay in peace thus
the size of the pie remains the same.
When war breaks out, its outcome (and how the two disputants share the pie)
depends on both disputants’ overall strength that reflects comprehensively their
military powers, their diplomatic ability, or the aggressiveness of their leaders
and citizens. We assume that each disputant i’s overall strength is his private
information, which we capture by his type, τi ∈ {H,L} where H (high) means
that disputant i’s overall strength is high, and L (low) means that disputant
i’s overall strength is low. Each disputant is likely to be of high (H) type with
probability q ∈ (0, 1). If both disputants are of the same type, then the war
ends in a tie and the countries share the pie of size θ equally, i.e. θ/2. When
types are asymmetric, high-type disputant wins and low-type disputant loses.
The winner gets the larger share p > 1/2 of the pie, while L-type obtains the
rest. The corresponding payoffs are pθ and (1 − p)θ. We assume that H-type
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has an incentive to wage a war against low-type: pθ > 1/2. To sum up, the
situation is described by the following:
S A
S 1/2, 1/2 θ/2, θ/2
A θ/2, θ/2 θ/2, θ/2
(a) Identical Types
S A
S 1/2, 1/2 pθ, (1− p)θ
A pθ, (1− p)θ pθ, (1− p)θ
(b) Different Types: 1 is H, 2 is L
Figure 3.1: Conflict Situation: War-and-Peace Game
Let γ = q
1−q denote the likelihood of a disputant believes his opponent to be
H-type, and let δ = pθ−1/2
(1−θ)/2 . As it is common in the simultaneous-move games,
this War-and-Peace game also has multiple equilibria. We assume that both
disputants play according to the following equilibrium strategy profile: L-type
chooses to stay, and H-type chooses to attack if γ < δ and to stay otherwise4.
In other words, L-type disputant always prefers peace to war because he has
no chance to win. H-type disputant, on the other hand, prefers peace to war
if and only if he is more likely to meet the same high type opponent (γ < δ).
Specifically, the condition implies that the expected payoff under war is larger
than the expected payoff under peace: γ < δ ⇐⇒ q(θ/2) + (1− q)pθ > 1/2.
The rationale behind our choice of a specific equilibrium is that it is a weakly
dominant strategy for L-type to stay, and that an equilibrium strategy profile in
which H-type chooses to stay if γ < δ Pareto-dominates all the other equilibria.
To make the conflict situation non-trivial, we assume that γ < δ in what follows.
Then, war breaks out with probability 1−(1−q)2 and peace is attained with the
remaining probability. The resulting equilibrium payoff for H-type disputant





+ (1 − q)pθ. For L-type, his payoff is
4For the detailed analysis of War-and-Peace game under arbitrary (possibly asymmetric)
beliefs, see Appendix.
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. Notice that the equilibrium payoff for L-type disputant
is different from his expected payoff under war, for he enjoys the peaceful payoff
(1/2) when facing the same L-type with probability 1− q.
3.2.2 A Model with Mediator Selection
To improve on a given conflict situation, both parties may initiate a mediation.
A mediator has no direct interest in a specific allocation of the pie and thus
wants to maximize the overall utilitarian welfare. However, the mediator may
not be impartial: she is interested in conferring advantages to one disputant. Let
λ ∈ [0, 1] measure the degree by which the mediator is biased towards disputant
1. For example, λ = 1
2
indicates an unbiased mediator. As λ increases, a
mediator’s bias toward disputant 1 gets more extreme. We thus define the
payoff of a mediator whose bias is λ as
wλ = λU1 + (1− λ)U2
where U1 and U2 are payoffs for disputant 1 and 2. That is, a mediator is
identified by her bias toward disputant 1, and the unit interval [0, 1] from which
λ takes its value is thus the set of (potential) mediators.
Our model of mediator selection consists of the two stages: the selection
stage and the mediation stage.
Selection Stage Nature chooses randomly a potential mediator λ from [0, 1].
This potential mediator makes a mediation offer to both disputants. Given
the offer, both disputants (after learning their types) simultaneously makes a
decision of whether to accept the mediation offer or not. Formally, an acceptance
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strategy of disputant i of type τi ∈ {H,L} is vi : {H,L} → {0, 1}, where 1
denotes “accept” and 0 denotes “reject”. If both disputants agree to accept the
offer (v1τ1 = v
2
τ2
= 1 for some (τ1, τ2) ∈ {H,L}2, then the selection stage is said
to be successful, and the mediation stage begins. Otherwise, both disputants
play the War-and-Peace game.
In either case, both disputants as well as the mediator observe the choice
made by each disputant when the selection stage is over. As each disputant
chooses a strategy after learning his type, his private information may be re-
vealed to both his opponent and the mediator. Let qi denote the posterior belief
about disputant i = 1, 2 being H-type, and it becomes a common knowledge.
Mediation Stage Once the mediator with bias λ is accepted, each disputant
privately sends a report m ∈ {H,L} to the mediator. Given the report m,
the mediator makes a recommendation (or a mechanism) in order to maxi-
mize her expected payoff. We assume that the mediator commits herself to the
mechanism. By applying the revelation principle, we consider only the direct
mechanisms. The mechanism thus consists of a type-dependent recommenda-
tion to each disputant about which action to take, either “Stay” or “Attack”,
and about how to split the pie conditional on the event that peace is achieved.
Without loss of generality, a direct mechanism proposed by the mediator with
her bias λ and her beliefs about disputants q1 and q2, can be summarized as
the tuple M ≡ M(λ, q1, q2) = (pτ , bτ )τ∈{H,L}2 where pτ is the probability of
peace and bτ is the share of the pie allocated to disputant 1 when the reported
type profile is τ ∈ {H,L}25. Given the mechanism M(λ, q1, q2) proposed by
5This formulation of a direct mechanism utilizes the following facts: (i) the sum of the
shares is one under peace, and (ii) a war breaks out unilaterally (i.e. if one disputant is
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the mediator, each disputant makes a decision whether to accept the proposed
mechanism or not. We assume that if either disputant rejects the mechanism,
war breaks out surely. Moreover, again by invoking the revelation principle, we
consider only the direct mechanisms in which each disputant reports his type
truthfully. To be specific, the incentive compatibility constraints for disputant
1 of each type are stated as follows:
(IC1H) q2
[





+ (1− q2) [pHLbHL + (1− pHL)pθ]
≥ q2
[





+ (1− q2) [pLLbLL + (1− pLL)pθ]
(IC1L) q2 [pLHbLH + (1− pLH)(1− p)θ] + (1− q2)
[





≥ q2 [pHHbHH + (1− pHH)(1− p)θ] + (1− q2)
[





The left-hand side of (IC1H) is the interim payoff of disputant 1 of H-type
when he truthfully reports his type. When facing H-type with probability q2,
peace is achieved with probability pHH and the share bHH is allocated. With
the remaining probability 1 − pHH , the mediation fails and war thus breaks
out. However, H-type does not win the war and obtain θ
2
. Facing L-type with
probability 1− q2, peace is achieved with probability pHL and the share bHL is
allocated. When the mediation fails, war breaks out. Then, H-type wins and
thus obtains θ
2
+ (1− θ). The right-hand side is the interim payoff when H-type
lies by reporting his type as L-type. In addition, the incentive compatibility
constraint for disputant 1 of L-type can also be interpreted in a similar way.
recommended to attack, then war breaks out regardless of the other disputant’s action). For
details, see Appendix.
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The participation constraints for disputant 1 of high type and low type are:
(PC1H) q2
[












(PC1L) q2 [pLHbLH + (1− pLH)(1− p)θ] + (1− q2)
[










Since the rejection of the proposed mechanism leads to war, the right-hand
sides are the interim payoffs under war. Similar to the case of disputant 1,
the incentive compatibility constraints and the participation constraints for dis-
putant 2 of each type can be formulated as follows:
(IC2H) q1
[





+ (1− q1) [pLH(1− bLH) + (1− pLH)pθ]
≥ q1
[





+ (1− q1) [pLL(1− bLL) + (1− pLL)pθ]
(IC2L) q1 [pHL(1− bHL) + (1− pHL)(1− p)θ] + (1− q1)
[





≥ q1 [pHL(1− bHL) + (1− pHL)(1− p)θ] + (1− q1)
[



















(PC2L) q1 [pHL(1− bHL) + (1− pHL)(1− p)θ] + (1− q1)
[











As the mediator’s expected payoff is the average of the payoffs of disputants
weighted by the bias λ, it can be formulated as follows:
Wλ
(




τ + (1− pτ )d1τ ) + (1− λ)(pτb2τ + (1− pτ )d2τ )]
= (2λ− 1)Eτ [pτ (b1τ − d1τ )] + (1− λ)(1− θ)Eτpτ + constant terms
or, equivalently,
= (1− 2λ)Eτ [pτ (b2τ − d2τ )] + λ(1− θ)Eτpτ + constant terms,
where biτ and d
i
τ are the shares of disputant i under peace and under war,
respectively. Specifically, b1τ = 1 − b2τ = bτ , d1HH = d1LL = θ/2, d1HL = pθ,
d1LH = (1− p)θ such that d1τ + d2τ = θ.
Remark 4. The expected payoff of the mediator Wλ consists of two distinct
components: The first component weighted by (2λ − 1) is the ex-ante expected
gain of disputant 1 relative to his payoff under war, and the second component
weighted by (1− λ)(1− θ) is the ex-ante expected probability of peace. Suppose
that the mediator is extremely biased toward disputant 1, i.e. λ = 1. Then,
the mediator coincides completely with the ex-ante gain of disputant 1. If the
chosen mediator is impartial, i.e. λ = 1
2
, then the mediator only cares about
the expected peace probability without any concern for a specific allocation of the
pie under peace. Lastly, suppose that the mediator is completely on the side of
disputant 2, i.e. λ = 0. Then, the resulting expression can be shown to be the
ex-ante gain of disputant 2. We relegate this to the Appendix.
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Explicitly, we may express the mediator’s payoff from the viewpoint of dis-
putant 1 as follows:
Wλ
(




















+(1− λ)(1− θ) [q1q2pHH + q1(1− q2)pHL + (1− q1)q2pLH + (1− q1)(1− q2)pLL]
+constant terms,
Hence, the optimal mediation programme (P) for the mediator is to deter-






pτ , bτ )τ∈{H,L}2
)
subject to the interim incentive compatibility constraints and the interim par-
ticipation constraints for both disputants: (IC1H), (IC1L), (PC1H), (PC1L),
(IC2H), (IC2L), (PC2H), and (PC2L).
Equilibrium Definition To define an equilibrium, we first define the payoff






L), the posterior beliefs q1
and q2 are calculated via Bayes’ rule whenever it is applicable. Define γi =
qi
1−qi
for i = 1, 2. For any type profile τ = (τ1, τ2) ∈ {H,L}2 such that a mediator
is rejected, i.e. v1τ1 6= v2τ2 , each disputant’s payoff is his equilibrium payoff in
War-and-Peace game. Specifically, if γ1 ≤ δ or γ2 ≤ δ, the payoff for disputant






6For the derivation of the expected payoff of the mediator, see Appendix.
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for i’s opponent j, j 6= i. Otherwise, if γ1 > δ and γ2 > δ, disputant i’s payoff
is 1/2 for both types.
Let E(q1, q2) be the set of equilibria in War-and-Peace game with the beliefs
q1 and q2. Whenever a mediator is accepted, i.e. for some type profile τ =
(τ1, τ2) ∈ {H,L}2 such that v1τ1 = v2τ2 = 1, the payoffs are determined by the
optimal mediation mechanism M(λ, q1, q2).
The solution concept we use is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. An equilibrium






L) satisfying the following:
• For his opponent’s nomination strategy (vjH , vjL), a mechanismM(λ, q1, q2),
and an equilibrium of War-and-Peace game E(q1, q2), disputant i of type
τ ∈ {H,L} maximizes his expected payoff.
• For the mediator’s bias λ and the posterior beliefs q1 and q2, the optimal
mechanism M(λ, q1, q2) solves (P).
• Given a strategy profile (v1H , v1L, v2H , v2L), the posterior belief q1 and q2 are
determined by Bayes’ rule whenever it is applicable.
The whole structure of the model, somewhat complicated though, is depicted
in Figure 3.2
3.3 Optimal Mechanism
In analyzing the model, we shall focus on pure strategy equilibria. That is,
we shall analyze the following cases: (i) viH = v
i
L, which we refer to as pooling
strategy, and (ii) viH 6= viL, so-called separating strategy, for i = 1, 2. Therefore,




Disputant 1 Disputant 2
Both Accept?
Disputants











Nature Mediator offers mediation
Figure 3.2: War-and-Peace Game with Mediator Selection
relegated to the Appendix. For more parsimonious analysis, we shall work with
the following notation: Let γi =
qi
1−qi denote the likelihood of disputant i being
H-type. We thus denote the mechanism as M(λ, γ1, γ2).
First of all, we consider an optimal mechanism under pooling strategy. If
the nomination stage is successful, no information is revealed in the nomination
stage. The posterior belief shared by the mediator and both disputants is thus
identical to the initial belief: γ1 = γ2 = γ < 1.
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In presenting the optimal mechanism, we shall report only the peace prob-
abilities and the rent obtained by each disputant7. Specifically, let duiτi de-
note the (informational) rent of disputant i = 1, 2 of type τi ∈ {H,L} after
normalizing by (1 − θ)(1 − q). That is, the disputant i’s interim payoff is
duiτi(1 − θ)(1 − q) + disputant i’s war payoff. Hence, we shall present pτ and
duiτi for τ = (τ1, τ2) ∈ {H,L}2.
When the mediator is unbiased (λ = 1/2), HMS solve for an optimal mecha-
nism by naturally assuming values of some choice variables by imposing symme-
try: pHL = pLH , bHL = bLH , and bHH = bLL = 1/2. This leads one to consider
constraints without identifying individual disputants. The details about the
solution and the approach for the optimal mechanism for a unbiased mediator
can be found in HMS(2015).
Lemma 12 (Optimal Mechanism under Pooling Strategy with Unbiased Me-






optimal mechanism M(1/2, γ, γ) satisfies the following:
• The incentive compatibility constraints of L-type and the participation con-
straints of H-type bind, and the others do not.
• For γ ≤ δ
2
, L-type dyads (L,L) do not fight (pLL = 1), asymmetric dyads
(H,L) and (L,H) enjoy peace with probability pHL = pLH =
1
1+δ−2γ ∈
(0, 1), H-type dyads (H,H) always fight (pHH = 0). The resulting interim
payoffs that disputants of each type obtain in addition to their payoff under









7We do not report the optimal split of the pie for each type profile under the mechanism.
For our analysis, only the rent obtained by each disputant under mechanism is relevant.
Moreover, the optimal split of the pie is indeterminate as there are multiple optima.
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• For γ > δ
2
, L-type dyads and asymmetric dyads do not fight (pLL = pHL =
pLH = 1) and H-type dyads fight with probability pHH =
2γ−δ
γ(1+δ−γ) ∈ (0, 1).









When the mediator is biased (λ 6= 1/2), it is actually not easy to figure out
an optimal mechanism. Unlike the case of an unbiased mediator, the optimal
mechanism proposed by a biased one treats disputants differently depending
on the direction of a mediator’s bias. Moreover, when it comes to a disputant
favored by the mediator, it is not easy to see whether a participation constraint
or an incentive compatibility constraint does or does not bind at the optimum.
We relegate the detailed description of how we resolve these difficulties and the
relevant proofs to the Appendix. In presenting the optimal mechanism for a
biased mediator, we shall only report the case where the mediator is biased in
favor of disputant 1 (λ > 1/2). This is without loss of generality because one
can easily obtain the optimal mechanism by exchanging the roles of disputants.
Lemma 13 (Optimal Mechanism under Pooling Strategy with biased Media-






λ > λ̂ ≡ 1+δ
2(1+δ−γ) . Then, the optimal mechanism M(λ, γ, γ) determines the
peace probabilities and each disputant’s rent (pτ and duiτi for τ = (τ1, τ2) ∈
{H,L}2) as follows:
(1) When the mediator is extremely biased toward disputant 1 (λ > λ̂), the
incentive compatibility constraints of both disputants of L-type, disputant
1 of H-type, and the participation constraints of disputant 2 of H-type
bind, i.e. (IC1L), (IC2L), (IC1H), and (PC2H) bind. Peace is attained
when the opponent, disputant 2, is of L-type: pLL = pHL = 1. In the
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remaining cases, war breaks out: pHH = pLH = 0. Disputant 1’s rent is




opponent, disputant 2, obtains his expected payoff under war regardless of
its type, i.e. du2H = du2L = 0.









constraints of H-type and the incentive compatibility constraints of L-type
bind and the others do not. That is, (IC1L), (IC2L), (PC1H), and (PC2H)
bind.
(a) For γ > δ/2, every dyad except for the H-type dyad (H,H) does not
fight (pLL = pHL = pLH = 1). The H-type dyad fight with probability
pHH =
2γ−δ
γ(1+δ−γ) ∈ (0, 1). For both disputants, H-types obtain its
expected payoff under war: du1H = du2H = 0. L-types enjoy the rent









(b) For γ ≤ δ/2, dyads when disputant 2 is L-type do not fight (pLL =
pHL = 1). For the H-type dyad, war always breaks out, pHH =
0. The remaining dyad (L,H) enjoys peace with probability pLH =
1−δ+2γ
1+δ−2γ ∈ (0, 1). Disputant 1 of L-type, toward which the mediator











< du1L. For both disputants, H-types obtain their
expected payoffs under war, i.e. du1H = du2H = 0.
Notice that with a biased mediator, the peace probabilities for the asymmet-
ric dyads and the rents for L-type disputants are disproportionately allocated
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across disputants. To be specific, the biased mediators allocates more resources
to the L-type disputant they favor, while allowing the opponent of L-type enjoy
peace with certainty. This does not seem intuitive at first sight: Why does the
mediator give a favor to the disputant in her opposition in terms of peace prob-
ability rather than to the disputant she favors? To understand this, suppose
that the mediator is biased in favor of disputant 1. In order to provide the
truth-telling incentive for disputant 2 of L-type, the mediator must give away
some informational rent. This can be done by raising peace probability pHL to
disputant 2 of L-type or, alternatively, by raising the share 1 − bHL allocated
to it under peace. They affect the payoff of disputant 1 differently: The former
also benefits disputant 1 of H-type, but the latter does only harm to disputant
1 of either type. Consequently, the mediator chooses the cheaper way, thus
guaranteeing peace to disputant 2 of L-type.
Corollary 3. Suppose that a mediator is biased in favor of one disputant, say
disputant 1. An optimal mechanism exhibits the following features:
• Disputant 2 of L-type enjoys no less chance of peace than disputant 1 of
the same type, i.e. pHL = pLL = 1 ≥ pLH .
• Disputant 1 of L-type obtains the information rent no less than disputant
2 of the same type: du1L ≥ du2L.
• A strict inequality holds for both in the above, if the mediator is either
moderately biased with γ ≤ δ/2, or extremely biased.
That is, the optimal mechanism allocates more shares of the pie to the favored
party while guaranteeing more peace probabilities to the disfavored party.
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Now, turning to the expected peace probability achieved under an optimal
mechanism, we show that a biased mediator, even with the bias, does not nec-
essarily perform worse than a unbiased one if her bias is not severe.
Theorem 6. In an optimal mechanism under pooling strategy, a biased mediator
achieves the same expected peace probability as an unbiased one if and only














Proof. It is easy to see that an extremely biased mediator achieves a lower
expected peace probability than an unbiased one. For the other direction, if
γ > δ/2, then it is obvious because the peace probabilities are identical for
both a moderately biased mediator and a unbiased one. For γ ≤ δ/2, the
peace probabilities under a moderately biased mediator differ from those under
a unbiased one only for asymmetric dyads. However, the expected peace prob-












This is striking because the biased mediator does not care about achieving
peace per se. The crucial factor that lies behind this result is the fact that
war is costly: If war breaks out, some proportion (1 − θ) of the pie is lost.
By achieving peace, a mediator may offer more shares to her ally by using this
resource that would have been lost under war. However, the mediator’s incentive
to attain peace is limited by the informational rent that must be given to the
opponent of L-type for providing him with the truth-telling incentive. As long
as she is not extremely biased, the mediator does not find this informational
rent costly. Therefore, the moderately biased mediator happens to maximize the
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peace probability as the unbiased mediator does. If the mediator is extremely
biased, however, the mediator would find the informational rent given to the
opponent too costly. Accordingly, she chooses to give no informational rent to
her opponent by reducing the peace probability.
Now, we consider an optimal mechanism when disputants fully reveal their
private information during the nomination stage. That is, v1H 6= v1L and v2H 6= v2L.
As both disputants’ types become common knowledge, the optimal mechanism
and the resulting payoff of each disputant are simply computed as follows:
Lemma 14 (Optimal Mechanism under Separating Strategy). The optimal
mechanism under separating strategy achieves peace with certainty. In addition,
a biased mediator allocates the share to the opponent (the disputant against
whom she is against) only to make the opponent accept the mechanism. Specif-
ically, the following hold:
(a) If the mediator is unbiased (λ = 1/2), the disputant 1’s share under peace
is bHH = bLL = 1/2, bHL = pθ +
1−θ
2
, and bLH = (1− p)θ + 1−θ2 .





, then bHH = bLL =
1− θ
2
, bHL = 1− (1− p)θ, bLH = 1− pθ.





, then the disputant
1’s share under peace is as follows: bHH = bLL =
θ
2
, bHL = pθ, and
bLH = (1− p)θ, and bLL = θ2 .
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3.4 Equilibria: Incidence of Biased Mediators
As we noted in the previous section, we focus on the pure strategy equilibria.
For the pooling-strategy equilibria, we have the following result:
Theorem 7. Suppose that disputants employ pooling strategies. Let λ̂ = 1+δ
2(1+δ−γ) .
Then, the following:











L = 1 is a pooling-strategy equilibrium.
(b) All pooling-strategy equilibria within λ ∈ (1− λ̂, 1/2) are all outcome-
equivalent. Moreover, so are all pooling-strategy equilibria within λ ∈
(1/2, λ̂).






there is a unique pooling-strategy equilibrium in which only the unbiased
mediator (λ = 1/2) is accepted.
The above theorem tells that a disputant would agree to accept the mediator
biased in favor of his opponent if he is likely to face the H-type opponent.
Otherwise, the disputant would not accept a mediator unless the mediator is
impartial. If a disputant anticipates that there are more to lose than to gain
in the conflict situation, he would rather to be engaged in a mediation, even
when he expects the mediator to be biased against him. This simple intuition,
however, does not provide an explanation why the disputant would gain under
mediation, despite the fact that the mediator stands on the opposite side of














Figure 3.3: Incidence of a Biased Mediator: λ ≥ 1/2
It is the informational rent that provides an answer. For illustration, sup-
pose that the mediator is biased in favor of disputant 1. Recall that under
mediation, disputant 2 of H-type’s participation constraint holds with equality.
In other words, he is indifferent between engaging in mediation and continuing
the conflict. For the disputant 2 of L-type, he has an incentive for pretending to
be H-type. To prevent this, the mediator needs to give the informational rent,
even though the mediator wishes to allocate more shares to her ally. Therefore,
even when the mediator is biased against him, disputant 2 would gain under
mediation.
Focusing on separating-strategy equilibria (v1H = v1L and v2H = v2L). We
obtain the following result:
Theorem 8. Suppose that disputants employ separating strategies. There ex-
ists a unique equilibrium in which L-type dyad (L,L) accepts only an unbiased
mediator (v1L = v
2





The intuition behind this result is rather simple. As there is always an in-
centive for L-type to mimic H-type, L-type would deviate to accept, whenever
there is a mediation for an asymmetric dyad, say (H,L) or (L,H). Similarly,
there exists no equilibrium where the H-type dyad successfully agree on a biased
mediator. Moreover, it is not an equilibrium that the H-type dyad successfully
agree on a unbiased mediator. By deviating to match with L-type under no
mediation, H-type obtains pθ which is larger than his payoff of 1/2 under medi-
ation. When L-type dyad (L,L) successfully selects a biased mediator, H-type
would deviate for his payoff of 1/2 is smaller than the deviation payoff of 1−θ/2.
When L-type dyad (L,L) agrees on the unbiased mediator, the resulting split
would be (1/2, 1/2). H-type has no incentive to deviate, for this is equal to
H-type’s payoff under no mediation. Moreover, L-type also would not deviate
to match with H-type under no mediation, for the deviation payoff of (1− p)θ
is smaller than the equilibrium payoff of 1/2.
Notice that at the separating-strategy equilibrium, the ex-ante peace prob-
ability is the same as the one in the War-and-Peace game. In addition, it is less
than the one at any pooling-strategy equilibria. That is, the separating-strategy
equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by any pooling-strategy equilibria. Therefore,
we restrict our attention to the pooling-strategy equilibria.
3.5 Effectiveness of Biased Mediators
From the results in the previous section, we are now able to discuss the issue
regarding the effectiveness of biased mediators. As it is demonstrated in The-
orem 6, in general, a biased mediator performs worse than a unbiased one, for
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those mediator with the extreme level of bias achieves the lower expected peace
probability. This stands by a general concern about the mediator’s bias.
Nevertheless, Theorem 7 reveals that one may disregard such a concern.
Although extremely biased mediators are not equally effective as the unbiased
one, these mediators would never be chosen in equilibrium. In other words,
if one observes that a biased third party acts as a mediator, such a mediator
would have a moderate level of bias, and more importantly, she would be equally
effective as a unbiased mediator.
Corollary 4. In any equilibria where a biased mediator is accepted, such a
mediator is equally effective as an unbiased one in resolving a conflict.
By looking at the above corollary, one may wonder about the connection
between the effectiveness of a mediator and the demand of disputants for the
mediator. As we argue earlier in the introduction, for the disputants, peace is
not the end itself. Each disputant cares only about how much he would gain
from the likely outcome of mediation, while comparing with the outcome from
an ongoing conflict. However, our result shows that only the effective mediators
are selected by disputants. Does this mean that disputants demand a mediator
who is likely to be effective? We argue that our result does not allow such an
interpretation. Extremely biased mediators, although they achieve a higher ex-
pected peace probability than the disputants may achieve in a conflict situation
(War-and-Peace game), fail to be selected in equilibrium due to the objection
by one party. Then, why do we see a connection between the effectiveness and
the mediation incidence?
The connection lies in how the mediator’s bias affects the allocation of the
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informational rent and the peace probability between the two parties. According
to our results, we may classify all mediators according to the mediation outcome
they propose into the following three categories: unbiased, moderately biased,
and extremely biased8. The unbiased mediator allocates the peace probability
and the informational rent equally across disputants. On the other hand, the
biased mediators tend to allocate more informational rent to her ally, while
allocating more peace probabilities to the opposite party.
What distinguishes the extremely biased ones from the moderately biased
ones is that for the former, no informational rent is allocated to the party whom
the mediator is biased against. As we discussed earlier in the section on the
optimal mechanism, this is due to the trade-off faced by the biased mediator. To
reiterate, maximizing the expected peace probability would be beneficial to the
mediator by allowing her to allocate more resources to the disputant whom she is
biased in favor of without wasting them in war. However, achieving peace incurs
a cost to the mediator. She needs to provide the informational rent, especially
even to the disputant she is not favor of. If her bias is not extreme, this cost
does not constrain the mediator’s willingness to promote peace. Otherwise, the
mediator would give no rent to the opposite party by compromising her benefit
from achieving peace.
A disputant, when making his decision in the nomination stage, would con-
sider this likely outcome of mediation under a mediator who is extremely biased
in favor of his opponent. Especially, when he is L-type, he would see that the
likely outcome, even under mediation, is indifferent to the outcome under war.
8Although a biased mediator in favor of disputant 1 makes a different recommendation
from one in favor of disputant 2, we include them into one category, for the recommendations
they propose exhibits symmetry.
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As he may enjoy a peaceful outcome with some positive probability in a given
conflict situation, he would rather to take a bet by refusing any mediation by
an extremely biased third party.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how mediator bias affects the initiation as well as the
effectiveness of mediation. Specifically, we investigate two different but closely
related issues: (i) why, and under which circumstances a disputant is willing
to accept a mediator who is biased in favor of his opponent, and (ii) whether
such a biased mediator, if accepted, is equally effective as an unbiased one in
promoting peace.
To this end, we construct a simple model in which disputants make a joint
decision of whether to accept a third-party who is potentially biased in favor of
one party as their mediator. Our model adds a novel feature of mediator bias to
the previous mechanism design approach to mediation (Fey and Ramsay, 2010;
Hörner et al., 2015). This leads to the optimal mechanism that is qualitatively
different from the one assuming the mediator’s impartiality. Specifically, the
biased mediator allocates the peace probabilities and the share of the pie un-
der peace differently across disputants: the favored party enjoys more interim
payoffs, while the disfavored party, in return, is guaranteed more peace proba-
bilities.
From this investigation of an optimal mechanism under a biased mediator,
we show that if a conflict is less likely to end up with a peaceful outcome, dis-
putants would accept a biased mediator. This result relies on the presence of
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private information. To elicit a disputant’s private information during the medi-
ation process, a mediator has to provide an informational rent to the disputant
even when she is biased against him. Hence, the disputant would be willing to
accept mediation if the alternative (conflict) is likely to ends up with war. This
is consistent with an empirical finding by Melin et al. (2013).
A novel result we find out, in relation to the effectiveness of a biased media-
tor, is that if accepted, a biased mediator achieves peace equally as an unbiased
one. This implies that accounting for an endogenous selection, a mediator’s
bias is independent of her effectiveness in resolving a conflict. This relies on the
fact that when the mediator is moderately biased, promoting peace as much as
possible is beneficial to her. To be specific, as war is socially wasteful, promot-
ing peace would allow a mediator to serve her ally’s interest. This, however,
increases the need for the mediator to give more informational rent to the disfa-
vored party. As long as the level of bias is moderate, providing an informational
rent does not compromise the benefit of promoting peace to the mediator.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 3
A.1 War-and-Peace Game with Arbitrary Be-
liefs
In this section, we analyze the game described as the environment by allowing
the probability of disputant i being H-type to differ. That is, disputant 1 is of
H-type with probability q1, and disputant 2 is of H-type with probability q2.
Let αiτ denote the probability that disputant i of type τ ∈ {H,L} chooses to
stay. Then, the expected payoff of each disputant for a given mixed strategy























































Disputant 2’s interim expected payoff for each type can be similarly defined
by exchanging the indices in the superscripts and subscripts. Thus, we shall
proceed by focusing on disputant 1. To solve for an equilibrium, we first compute
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≥ 0, it is easy to see that ‘Stay’ (αiL = 1, i = 1, 2) is a weakly
dominant strategy for L-type. For H-type, however, the H-type opponent’s
strategy matters to determine the best response. First of all, we have the
following lemma:
Lemma 15. Suppose that L-type chooses his weakly dominant strategy “stay”.
For disputant i of H-type, if γj ≤ δ for j 6= i, “attack” is a weakly dominant
strategy, i.e. “attack” yields a strictly higher expected payoff than “stay” unless
the other disputant j of H-type chooses peace with probability 1.























and equality holds if and only if γ2 = δ.
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For γ2 > δ, the best response of the H-type disputant depends the H-type
opponent’s strategy. If the H-type opponent’s strategy is to “Attack” with
probability more than α2H <
δ
γ2
, the best response would be to “Attack” as well.
Based on this one can easily obtain the following:
Proposition 1. The set of undominated Bayesian Nash equilibria of the War-
and-Peace game consists of the following:
(1) γ1 ≤ δ or γ2 ≤ δ: L-type chooses to stay and H-type chooses to attack.
The equilibrium outcome is war with probability (1− q1)(1− q2).
(2) γ1 > δ and γ2 > δ:
(a) L-type chooses to stay and H-type chooses to attack. The equilibrium
outcome is war with probability (1− q1)(1− q2).
(b) Both types chooses to stay. The equilibrium outcome is peace.
(c) (mixed strategy equilibrium) L-type chooses to stay and H-type dis-
putant i chooses to stay with probability δ
γi
. The equilibrium outcome





















+ (1 − q2)pθ and u1H(b) = 12 . The equilibrium (b) yields the
highest payoff: u1H(b) > u1H(a) = u1H(c). For γ1 > δ and γ2 > δ, the equilib-
rium strategy profile in which H-type chooses to “Stay” Pareto-dominates the
other equilibrium strategy profiles. We thus assume that the most efficient equi-
librium is chosen among the multiple undominated Bayesian Nash equilibria.
In all, we have the following:
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Corollary 5. The set of the most efficient undominated Bayesian Nash equi-
libria of the War-and-Peace game consists of the following:
(1) γ1 ≤ δ or γ2 ≤ δ: L-type chooses to stay and H-type chooses to attack.
The equilibrium outcome is war with probability (1 − q1)(1 − q2). The











+ (1− qj)pθ for j 6= i.
(2) γ1 > δ and γ2 > δ: Both types chooses to stay. The equilibrium outcome
is peace. The expected payoff for both L-type and H-type is 1
2
.
In short, L-type always chooses to stay, while H-type chooses to stay if and only
if γ > δ.
A.2 Formulation of The Mediation Programme
Formulation of a direct mechanism A direct mechanism consists of the
following two functions:
• an action rule φ : {H,L}2 →4 ({A, S}2) and
• a split rule β : {H,L}2 → ∆ = {(b′i, b′2)|b′1 + b′2 = 1} that specifies the
share b′i of disputant i = 1, 2.
where 4 ({A, S}2) is the set of probability distributions over the set {A, S}2.
Note that an action rule can be shortened to be a rule that assigns peace proba-
bility for each type profile. Specifically, let φ(τ) = (φ(τ)(SS), φ(τ)(SA), φ(τ)(AS), φ(τ)(AA))
for a type profile τ ∈ T = {H,L}. Note that a war may break out unilaterally
and that the payoff relevant information contained in an action rule is whether
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a war breaks out or not. Therefore, one may summarize the action rule by
defining the peace probability as pτ ≡ φ(τ)(SS) and 1 − pτ ≡ φ(τ)(SA) +
φ(τ)(AS) + φ(τ)(AA) for τ ∈ {H,L}2. For a split rule β(τ) = (β1(τ), β2(τ)),
one can consider only the share of disputant 1 because the share of disputant
2 can be computed simply by b′2 = 1 − b′1. Hence, define bτ to denote the
share of disputant 1 under peace. To sum up, a direct mechanism is a tuple
Γ = (pHH , pHL, pLH , pLL, bHH , bHL, bLH , bLL).
Derivation of the expected payoff of the mediator Let bτ and dτ denote
the size of the pie allocated to disputant 1 when the type profile is τ under
peace and under war, respectively. The size of the pie allocated to disputant 2
under peace is thus 1 − bτ , for the size of the pie is one. Similarly, the share
allocated to disputant 2 under war is θ− dτ , for the size of the pie shrinks to θ.
The mediator’s expected payoff, given the type τ of disputant 1, is thus
wλ(τ) = pτ [λ(bτ − dτ ) + (1− λ) {(1− bτ )− (θ − dτ )}]
= [(2λ− 1)pτ (bτ − dτ ) + (1− λ)(1− θ)pτ ]
or, equivalently
= [(1− 2λ)pτ {(1− bτ )− (θ − dτ )}+ λ(1− θ)pτ ]
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Therefore, the ex-ante expected payoff of the mediator for given q1 and q2 is:







































+λ(1− θ) [q1q2pHH + q1(1− q2)pHL + (1− q1)q2pLH + (1− q1)(1− q2)pLL]
The expression in the main body of the paper is the first one.
Lemma 16. The following statement holds:
(1) If λ = 1
2
, the mediator’s expected payoff is the expected probability of peace
up to a constant.
(2) If λ = 1, the mediator’s expected payoff is the ex-ante expected gain of
disputant 1.
(3) If λ = 0, the mediator’s expected payoff is the ex-ante expected gain of
disputant 2.
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Proof. The statements (2) and (3) are obvious from the expressions. To show
(1), plug λ = 1
2
into the mediator’s expected payoff. Then, we have
W1/2(bH , bL, pH , pL) =
1− θ
2
[q1q2pHH + q1(1− q2)pHL + (1− q1)q2pLH + (1− q1)(1− q2)pLL]
Since the constant multiplicative term does not affect the maximization prob-
lem, we can abstract away to obtain the following: q1q2pHH + q1(1 − q2)pHL +
(1−q1)q2pLH +(1−q1)(1−q2)pLL. This is nothing but the expected probability
of peace.
Reformulation of a mediator’s problem Let Bτ denote the share of (1−θ)
(that would be lost under war) allocated to disputant 1 of type τ ∈ {H,L}
conditional on the event that peace is achieved, i.e. Bτ =
bτ−dτ
1−θ where bτ and dτ
are the size of the pie allocated to disputant 1 of type τ under peace and under
war, respectively. Let γi =
qi
1−qi be the likelihood of disputant i (i = 1, 2) being
H-type.
The mediation problem by a mediator with the bias λ and the posterior
likelihood γ1 and γ2 about disputant 1 and 2 being H-type, can be reformulated
in the following way:
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max Wλ(BHH , BHL, BLH , BLL, pHH , pHL, pLH , pLL)
= (2λ− 1) [γ1γ2pHHBHH + γ1pHLBHL + γ2pLHBLH + pLLBLL]
+(1− λ) [γ1γ2pHH + γ1pHL + γ2pLH + pLL]




















(PC1H) γ2pHHBHH + pHLBHL ≥ 0
(PC1L) γ2pLHBLH + pLLBLL ≥ 0
















(PC2H) γ1pHH (1−BHH) + pLH(1−BLH) ≥ 0
(PC2L) γ1pHL(1−BHL) + pLL (1−BLL) ≥ 0






























. (If ex-post participation constraints are consid-
ered, pτBτ ∈ [0, 1] for τ ∈ {HH,HL,LH,LL}.)
One advantage of this reformulation is to make one treat the type-dependent
outside options in the participation constraints as if it is type-independent by
normalizing them to be zero: Notice the right-hand sides of (PCiH) and (PCiL)
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for i = 1, 2 are all zeros. More importantly, with this reformulation, one may
see whether the optimal mediation mechanism is self-enforcing or not by looking
at the additional gain or loss to the payoff under war. If the values of Bτ for
τ ∈ {H,L}2 belong to the unit interval in the optimal mechanism, then the
mechanism is self-enforcing: The mechanism maximizes the mediator’s payoff
by allocating the share (1−θ) while making no disputant worse than its ex-post
payoff under war.
A.3 Optimal Mechanism By a Biased Mediator
under Pooling Strategy
In this section, we analyze the optimal mechanism under pooling strategy, i.e.
γ1 = γ2 = γ < δ. The results in this section indeed constitute the proofs for
Lemma 13, Theorem 6, and Corollary 3.
Lemma 17. The participation constraints for each disputant of L-type, (PCiL),
is non-binding.
Proof. One can easily see that for each disputant i = 1, 2,
• RHS of (ICiL) > LHS of (ICiH) =LHS of (PCiH) and
• RHS of (ICiH) < LHS of (ICiL) =LHS of (PCiL).
By the above inequalities, (ICL) and (PCH) imply (PCL):
LHS(PCiL) = LHS(ICiL) ≥ RHS(ICiL), by (ICiL)
> LHS(ICiH) = LHS(PCiH), by (PCiH)
≥ 0
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When the mediator is biased (λ 6= 1
2
), we may restrict our attention only
to the case in which the mediator is biased toward disputant 1 (λ > 1
2
), for
the other case corresponds to the case where the mediator is biased in favor of
disputant 2.
Lemma 18. The participation constraint for disputant 2 of H-type and the
incentive compatibility constraints of L-type for both disputants are binding at
the optimum. That is, (IC1L), (IC2L), and (PC2H) hold with equality.
Proof. First of all, (PC2H) is binding. If not, raise BHH and BLH simultaneously












of (IC1L thus increase by the same amount. This procedure leads to the increase
in the value of the objective function without violating the other two constraints.
For (IC2L), if it is not binding, one may raise the value of the objective function
by increasing BHL and BLL simultaneously while keeping (IC1L). Similarly to
the previous case, if the discrepancy between the RHS and the LHS of (IC2L)











Lastly, (IC1L) is binding at the optimum. Suppose that (IC1L) holds with
strict inequality. Notice first that due to (PC1H), at least one of BHH or BHL is
non-negative. Moreover, (IC2L) implies that either 1−BHL or 1−BLL is non-
negative. If BHL ∈ [0, 1], we may raise pHL and thus the value of Wλ without
violating the other two constraints, (IC2L) and (PC2H). Suppose that BHL > 1.
By (IC2L), either BLL < 0 or BLL ∈ [0, 1]. In the former case, raise pLL. In
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the latter case, one may raise pHL and pLL simultaneously without violating the
other two constraints.
By the previous lemma, the mediation programme can be expressed as fol-
lows:
max λ (γpHL + pLL) +
[



























(IC2H) γpHL + pLL ≥ γpHH + pLH
with the following constraints for Bτ with τ ∈ {H,L}2:

















(PC2H) γpHH(1−BHH) + pLH(1−BLH) = 0
First of all, notice that pLL = 1 at the optimum, for it appears only on the left-
hand side of each constraint. Then, we analyze the programme in two steps: In
the first step, we treat pHH and pLH as fixed and solve for pHL that maximizes
λ (γ1pHL + 1). In the second step, after plugging pLH , we choose pHH and pLH
that maximizes the objective function Wλ.
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Step 1 : For fixed pHL, pLL, the optimal mechanism solves the following
programme:
(P1) max λ (γpHL + 1)














(PROB) pHL ∈ [0, 1]
If γ ≤ 1+δ
2
, then the feasible set for pHL is identified by the following constraints:
(IC1H) pHL ≤ 1− γ(pHH − pLH)
(PC1H) pHL ≤










(PROB) pHL ∈ [0, 1]




1, 1− γ(pHH − pLH),


















, then the feasible set for pHL can be written as the following:
(IC1H) pHL ≤ 1− γ(pHH − pLH)
(PC1H) pHL ≥










(PROB) pHL ∈ [0, 1]
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,min{1, 1− γ(pHH − pLH)}
]
.
The optimal solution for pHL, if it exists, thus occurs at the supremum of the
feasible set:
pHL = min{1, 1− γ2(pHH − pLH)}.
Step 2 : Firstly, we remark on the objective function for each values of pHL.
(1) When pHL = 1, the objective function Wλ(pHH , pLH) is written as follows:
W
(1)
λ ≡ λ (γ + 1) + [(1 + δ)/2− λ(1 + δ − γ)] (γpHH + pLH)
Let λ̂ = 1+δ
2(1+δ−γ) . If λ < λ̂, then the coefficients on pHH and pLH are
positive.














− λ(1 + δ − γ − γ2)
]
pLH
The coefficient on pHH is negative.










































(1−2λ)−γ(1−λ) < 0 and 1−2λ < 0.
Now, we analyze the mediation programme for the following cases: (A)
γ ≤ 1+δ
2








(A) γ ≤ 1+δ
2
: We first characterize the feasible set (conditional on pHL). As
γ < 1+δ
2










2γ(1 + δ − γ)
1 + δ − 2γ
)
pHH +
1− δ + 2γ
1 + δ − 2γ
As for pHL = 1− γ(pHH − pLH), the feasible set is thus characterized by
pLH ≤ pHH
pLH(γ + 1) ≤ −
(
γ(1 + δ)
1 + δ − 2γ
)
pHH +
1− δ + 2γ
1 + δ − 2γ




−γ , the feasible set is defined by follow-
ing inequalities:
pHL =
2− 2γ(1 + δ − γ)pHH
1 + δ − 2γ − pLH ≥ 0
pHH , pLH ∈ [0, 1]
pLH ≥ −
(
2γ(1 + δ − γ)
1 + δ − 2γ
)
pHH +
1− δ + 2γ
1 + δ − 2γ
pLH(γ + 1) ≥ −
(
γ(1 + δ)
1 + δ − 2γ
)
pHH +
1− δ + 2γ
1 + δ − 2γ
The feasible set in each case is thus depicted in Figure A.1.
(1) pHL = 1: For λ < λ̂ ≡ 1+δ2(1+δ−γ) , both pHH and pLH contribute positively to



































(b) γ > δ2
Figure A.1: Feasible set for (pHH , pLH): γ ≤ 1+δ2
(PC1H). As the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) γ is less steeper than




−γ , raising pLH always contributes more
to the objective function than raising pHH does. Thus, the optimum occurs
at the point that maximizes pLH in sacrifice of pHH . When γ > δ/2, pLH
cannot be larger than one, and pHH cannot decrease further. Therefore,
pLH = 1 and pHH =
2γ−δ
γ(1+δ−γ) . On the other hand, if γ ≤ δ/2, (PC1H)
binds and pLH =
1−δ+2γ
1+δ−2γ while pHH = 0.
If λ ≥ λ̂, then both pHH and pLH contribute negatively to the objective
function. Hence, pHH = pLH = 0 at the optimum, for it is feasible.
(2) pHL = 1− γ(pHH − pLH): If λ ≤ λ̂, then the coefficient on pLH is positive




δ − γ(γ + 1)) > (2λ − 1)γ 1+δ
2
. That is, raising pLH contributes more to
the objective function than reducing pHH . The optimum thus occurs at
pHH = pLH =
1−δ+2γ













optimum when λ ≤ 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
optimum when λ > 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)












optimum when λ > 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
optimum when λ ≤ 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
(b) γ > δ2
Figure A.2: The optimal values for (pHH , pLH): pHL = 1







pHL = 1− γ(pHH − pLH)
optimum when λ ≤ 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
optimum when λ > 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)





−γ : Recall that both coefficients are nega-
tive. Thus, decreasing both as much as possible is optimal. Moreover, if




steeper than the slope of (PC1H) which is 1 + δ − γ. Therefore, the op-
timum occurs at pHH = pLH =
1−δ+2γ
2γ(δ−γ)+1+δ . Otherwise, if λ ≤ λ̂, MRS is
steeper than the slope of (PC1H), thereby the optimum occurs at pLH = 1
and pHH =
2γ−δ
γ(1+δ−γ) for γ > δ/2, and pLH =
1−δ+2γ














optimum when λ > 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
optimum when λ ≤ 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
1−δ+2γ
2γ(δ−γ)+1+δ















optimum when λ ≤ 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
optimum when λ > 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
(b) γ > δ2





In order to determine the optimal mechanism, we compare the values of the ob-
jective function. When λ ≥ λ̂, all the coefficients on pHH and pLH are negative.






λ . Suppose otherwise




λ and this value is larger than W
(2)
λ .
In all, the optimal mechanism dictates the following:
(i) For λ ≥ λ̂, pHH = pLH = 0 and pLL = pHL = 1. The interim payoffs












, du2H = γ(1−BHH) + (1−BLH) = 0, and
du2L = 0.
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(ii) For λ < λ̂, pLL = 1 and
(a) if γ > δ
2
, then pLL = pHL = pLH = 1 and pHH =
2γ−δ
γ(1+δ−γ) . The in-












tion (BHH , BHL, BLH , BLL) is thus determined by the following: du1H =












, du2H = γpHH(1 − BHH) + (1 − BLH) = 0, and du2L =






(b) if γ ≤ δ
2
, then pHL = 1, pLH =
1−δ+2γ
1+δ−2γ , and pHH = 0. The interim payoffs
for disputant 1 and disputant 2 as well as the allocation are determined












BHL = 0, BLH = 1, BHH = BLL =
1+δ
2














: We first characterize the feasible set (conditional on
pHL). As γ1 >
1+δ
2
, either pHL = 1 or pHL = 1 − γ(pHH − pLH) under the






. Then, for pHL = 1, the feasible









1− δ + 2γ
1 + δ − 2γ
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On the other hand, for pHL = 1 − γ2(pHH − pLH), the feasible set is thus
characterized by
pLH ≤ pHH











1− δ + 2γ
1 + δ − 2γ













Figure A.5: Feasible set for (pHH , pLH): γ >
1+δ
2










optimum when λ ≤ 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)
optimum when λ > 1+δ2(1+δ−γ)










(b) pHL = 1− γ(pHH − pLH)
Figure A.6: The optimal values for (pHH , pLH): γ >
1+δ
2
In all, the optimal mechanism dictates the following:
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(i) For λ ≥ λ̂, pHH = pLH = 0 and pLL = pHL = 1. The interim payoffs












, du2H = γ(1−BHH) + (1−BLH) = 0, and
du2L = 0.
(ii) For λ < λ̂, pLL = pHL = pLH = 1 and pHH =
2γ−δ
γ(1+δ−γ) . The interim












tion (BHH , BHL, BLH , BLL) is thus determined by the following: du1H =













A.4 Proofs for Theorem 7 and Theorem 8.
Proofs for Pooling-Strategy Equilibria: Theorem 7 Without loss of
generality, we consider a deviation by disputant 1 when λ ≤ 1/2, for it is
symmetric for disputant 2. If deviating, disputant 1’s belief is γ and disputant
2’s belief is γ′, which is arbitrary. Let dudiτi denote the payoff of disputant i of
type τi. Suppose that disputant 1 is H-type. Then, disputant 1H would attack,
and war breaks out unilaterally, regardless of an out-of-equilibrium belief γ′ of
disputant 2. The payoff under deviation is dud1H = 0. On other hand, suppose
that disputant 1 is L-type. Then, the deviation outcome is determined by
disputant 2’s out-of-equilibrium belief γ′. When γ′ ≤ δ, disputant 2H would
attack, and war breaks out with probability q. disputant 1L obtains q(1−p)θ+
(1− q)/2, and thus dud1L = 1/2. For γ′ > δ, disputant 2H would stay, and war
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never breaks out. The resulting payoff for 1L is dud1L = γ(δ + 1) + 1/2.
(i) Suppose that the chosen mediator is moderately biased against disputant







. As du1H = 0, disputant 1H does not gain by
deviation. Moreover, for γ > δ/2, the mediation payoff is the same as in the
previous case, and then disputant 1L would not deviate if γ′ ≤ δ. For the









γ′ ≤ δ, we have
du1L − dud1L ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
(
1− δ + 2γ







≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≥ δ(1 + δ)
2(2 + δ)
If γ′ > δ, du1L − dud1L = − δ
2+(δ−2γ)(1+2γ(1+δ))




and γ′ ≤ δ, the deviation is not profitable. Otherwise, disputant 1L would
deviate.
(ii) Suppose that the chosen mediator is unbiased: λ = 1/2. Recall that the
mediation payoffs are the same as those under the moderately biased mediator









and du1H = 0. Obviously, disputant 1H does not have
any incentive to deviate. For disputant 1L, if γ′ ≤ δ, we have du1L − dud1L =
γ
2(1+δ−γ) > 0, and thus deviation is not profitable. When γ
′ > δ, du1L − dud1L =
−γ (1+2δ)+(δ−γ)(1+δ)
2(1+δ−γ) < 0, i.e. disputant 1L would deviate.
(iii) Suppose that the chosen mediator is extremely biased against disputant
1. That is, λ < 1 − 1+δ
2(1+δ−γ) . Under mediation, du1H = du1L = 0. Obviously,
disputant 1H has no incentive for deviation. However, disputant 1L would
always deviate because du1L − dud1L = −dud1L < 0.
In all, if γ′ ≤ δ and a disputant would not deviate from the mediator against




Proofs for Separating Strategy Equilibrium: Theorem 8 The proof
proceeds in the series of the following lemmas.
Lemma 19. There exists no separating-strategy equilibrium in which (H,H)-
dyad selects a mediator
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. v1H = v
2
H = 1 for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. If λ < 1/2 (bias
against 1) is accepted, then disputant 1H obtains θ/2. By deviating to match
with L-type under no mediation , however, disputant 1H would obtain pθ > 1/2.
Symmetrically, for λ > 1/2, disputant 2H has a profitable deviation to no
mediation. Lastly, if λ = 1/2, disputant 1H obtains 1/2. Still, matching with
2L under no mediation is a profitable deviation.
Lemma 20. There exists no separating-strategy equilibrium in which an asym-
metric dyad, (H,L) or (L,H), selects a mediator.
Proof. Consider v1H = v
2
L = 1 and λ > 1/2 (bias toward disputant 1). Disputant
2L obtains (1 − p)θ. By deviating to match with 1L under no mediation, he
would obtain at least 1/2 > (1−p)θ. Similarly, when λ < 1/2 and v1L = v2H = 1,
1L would deviate to match with 2L. Lastly, if v1H = v
2
L = 1 and λ = 1/2 (or,
symmetrically, v1L = v
2




larger than any payoff of 1L. Hence, 1L would mimic 1H.
Lemma 21. There exists no separating-strategy equilibrium such that (L,L)-
dyad selects a biased mediator.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that there exists, i.e. v1L = v
2
L = 1
and λ > 1/2. Note that H-type disputants obtains 1/2 under no mediation.
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Disputant 1L obtains 1 − θ
2
which is larger than the payoff of disputant 1H.
Therefore, disputant 1H would deviate to pool himself with 1L.
The only remaining possibility is that L-types succeeds in selecting an un-
biased mediator (v1L = v
2
L = 1 and λ = 1/2) and H-types do not accept the
mediator (v1H = v
2
H = 0). We show that this is indeed a separating equilibrium.
Consider disputant 1 without loss of generality. Disputant 1 of H-type obtains
1/2. If it deviates to mimic L-type, the resulting payoff is 1/2 no larger than
his equilibrium payoff, thus H-type would not deviate. Now, we argue that
L-type does not have any profitable deviation. Suppose that L-type deviates
to no mediation. Then, his payoff facing H-type is (1− p)θ, and this is strictly
smaller than his equilibrium payoff of 1/2.
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